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CIVIL LIBERTIES IN UNCIVIL TIMES
The Perilous Quest to Preserve American Freedoms
By Kenneth Lasson*

The Constitution is not a suicide pact.
– Justice Robert Jackson1
He was not a suicide bomber, he was on a military operation and he was a martyr.
– Mariam Farhat2

INTRODUCTION
The simple vision sanctifying the Declaration of Independence – that life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness are inalienable rights – is quintessential to the American psyche. No less
taken for granted are the deep-rooted notions of fairness and justice nurtured by the Constitution
and guaranteed by the Bill of Rights: the First Amendment’s fundamental freedoms, limitations
on unreasonable governmental intrusions, and procedural protections afforded those accused of
having committed a crime.
In times of terror and tension, however, civil liberties quickly become subjective.
Survival, after all, is still and understandably a nation’s strongest instinct – even at the cost of
individual rights. As this is being written at the dawn of the Twenty-first Century, over two
*

Professor of Law, University of Baltimore. I am grateful to my research assistant on this project, Michelle Weiler,
for her diligence and skill in bringing together disparate elements of a lengthy manuscript. Thanks are also due to
two former assistants, Tora Scott and Carl Zacarias, who worked on earlier drafts.
1
Dissenting in Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 at 37 (1949). This oft-quoted dictum is in fact a
paraphrase of Justice Jackson’s statement (“There is a danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic
with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”), and has been
variously attributed to others, like Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes (see Editorial, 93 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 860) and Arthur Goldberg (see ,e.g., Amy Hack, Forfeiting Liberty, 2 CARDOZO PUBLIC L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 469 at 514). Holmes never said it. Goldberg did, in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144 at 160 (1963).
2
Newly elected member of Hamas, on her pride at losing three sons in jihad (“I knew what he was going to do.
And when he succeeded, I was happy and I thanked G-d. . . . They are all martyrs.”) Quoted in Fiona Bartongaza,
Mother of All Martyrs, NEW YORK POST (Online Edition), February 27, 2006.
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centuries of traditional American ideals appear to be genuinely in jeopardy.
This article examines the perilous quest to preserve them.
*
Citizens have been deprived of various rights and freedoms from the earliest colonial
days, especially in their religious beliefs and practices. Such restrictions, particularly during
times of war, were not eliminated by either the birth of the nation or the adoption of the Bill of
Rights. In most of these cases the limitations on liberty were deemed warranted as necessary to
insure order or preserve national security.
Only in hindsight have we come to realize that this end-justifies-the-means approach has
seldom if ever been justified – that the government’s regulation of basic freedoms does not
ultimately preserve national security.

As Justice Brennan observed, “After each perceived

security crisis ended, the United States has remorsefully realized that the abrogation of civil
liberties was unnecessary. But it has proven unable to prevent itself from repeating the error
when the next crisis came along.”3
Put another way: Must we become like our enemies in order to defeat them? We may
debate the question of whether hindsight has always proven that limitations on liberties were
always unjustified, but in an era suicide bombers and non-governmental terrorist groups bent on
destruction of democracies, does historical experience retain any relevancy? Have we reached
the point where we must fairly face the question of whether there are limits to historical
perceptions?
In any event, achieving a proper balance between individual rights and national security,
however, is less a matter of simple adherence to abstract principle than it is a daunting task of

3

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of Security
Crisis, Address to the Law School of Hebrew University, Jerusalem at 1 (Dec. 22, 1987), available at
http://www.capaa.wa.gov/pdf/brennan/pdf.
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eternal vigilance. The wartime challenge we face is to remember well the lessons learned in the
past. In this day and age, when whole societies appear to be genuinely in jeopardy at the hands
of international terrorists and rogue nations with weapons of mass destruction, to what extent can
we afford to indulge in the civil liberties we have known and cherished?
Part I of this article is a brief history of civil liberties in America during past conflicts –
focusing particularly on the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. It also
questions the thesis promulgated by Chief Justice William Rehnquist in his 1998 book, All the
Laws but One, that in times of war Presidents and courts rightly restrict freedom and defer to the
military on matters of national security. Part II describes the various actions taken by the
government to conduct the so-called war against terrorism – including invasions of privacy,
immigration policies and controls, profiling, pre-trial detentions, and secret military tribunals
Part III analyzes the serious Constitutional questions raised by the government’s actions in its
conduct of the current war against terrorism.
Our national purpose has become how best to preserve both the national security and the
individual liberties we enjoy as Americans – noble and fundamental goals, the acquisition and
maintenance of which themselves raise issues both profound and practical.
How best can we once again meet that historic challenge?
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES DURING WARTIME

The First Hundred Years
The Revolutionary War4
The status of American civil liberties during wartime is hardly a new issue. Suppression
of fundamental freedoms during times of real or threatened hostilities began very shortly after
the nation’s founding.
In 1798, only seven years after enactment of the Bill of Rights, the United States found
itself on the brink of war with France – which itself was in the middle of a revolution raging
throughout Europe. In response, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, making it a crime
for an individual or organization to publish criticism of federal officials or the government, and
authorizing the president to detain or deport citizens who did.5

These measures were not

popular. A few states passed resolutions in protest, calling the laws “palpable violations” of the
Constitution and charging that the states’ “silent acquiescence [in accepting the acts was] highly
criminal.”6
When Thomas Jefferson was elected President in 1800, he pardoned those convicted
under the Alien and Sedition Acts – but the laws were never repealed, despite strong public
opposition. The Sedition Act expired under its own terms, and the Alien Act remained on the
4

Although the deprivation of religious liberties during the colonial period is a relevant precursor to the subject
matter of this Article, a thorough treatment of that subject must, for space reasons, be presented elsewhere. For a
summary of religious freedom in early America, see Kenneth Lasson, Free Exercise in the Free State: Maryland's
Role in Religious Liberty and the First Amendment, 31 J. OF CHURCH & ST. 201 (1989) and Free Exercise in the
Free State: Maryland's Role in the Development of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 81 (1988).
5
Chs. 58, 66, 74, 1 Stat. 570, 577, 596 (1798).
6
About two-dozen people were jailed under the Sedition Act for criticizing President John Adams See generally
Debora K. Kristensen, Finding the Right Balance: American Civil Liberties in Time of War, 44-Dec Advocate
(Idaho) 20 (2001). See also Michael Kent Curtis, Symposium: Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each Other
and the Next Century: Teaching Free Speech from an Incomplete Fossil Record, 34 AKRON L. REV. 231 (2000).
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books until the time of World War II.7

Tensions between the Press and the Military
Although the press and military play critical roles in the maintenance of democracy, the
inherent objectives of each are often at odds with one another. It is because of their differing
(and sometimes opposing) purposes that governmental restrictions on the media during times of
tension and war have often increased. Despite the public’s dependency on the press for news
and opinion, the military has virtually unfettered power to limit access to the battlefield.
Outright suppression of dissenting points of view has been has been less commonplace in
America’s wartime history than in that of other nations, but the military has always exercised its
right to impose restrictions on reporters and its inclination to manipulate the information they
receive.
Military officers generally view secrecy and surprise as essential to successful war
strategy. The press, on the other hand, exists to gather and report as much news as it can and to
hold the government accountable – an objective that is fundamental to traditional American
values.
The inherent tensions between a free press and a strong military surfaced early on.
When James Madison introduced the Bill of Rights to the House of Representatives, he
included two separate amendments that reflected his intent to protect the press from all
governmental encroachments:
The People shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to
publish their sentiments, and the freedom of the press, as one of the great
7

WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 70 (1998) [hereinafter
REHNQUIST]. See also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 774-75 (1950).
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bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable. . . . No State shall violate the equal rights
of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.8
During debate in the House of Representatives, Madison argued that “the liberty of the
press is expressly declared to be beyond the reach of the government.” Although the House
passed both amendments, the Senate rejected them. Few details of its debate were reported; the
language that the Senators finally agreed upon would eventually form the basis for the First
Amendment: “That Congress shall make no law, abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press…”9

The War of 1812
A few decades later, America once again found itself having to balance the protection of
individual freedoms against the necessity of national security.

During the War of 1812, after

British forces captured an American position near New Orleans, General Andrew Jackson
declared martial law. Although the war officially ended with the signing of the Treaty of Ghent
in December of 1814, Jackson, because he felt that continuation of martial law would help
maintain order in New Orleans, tried to silence reports that the treaty had been signed.
However, a journalist named Louis Louailler reported the cessation of hostilities and
called for an end to martial law. General Jackson had him arrested. Louailler, charged with
8

There were five versions of the amendment: the one introduced by Madison; a new version by a House select
committee (which was passed by the House unchanged); the Senate's initial revision; a second Senate draft resulting
from a floor amendment; and the final version produced by a conference committee. The various texts can be found
in 1 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 451 (1789) (J. Gales ed. 1834).
9
Although this language may not reflect the Founders’ intention to ensure that the press be free from all
governmental restrictions – executive, judicial, or legislative – at that point in history the legislature was viewed as
the primary source of federal power, and use of the word “Congress” may be interpreted to mean that the press not
be limited by any of the branches of government. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 23,
1789), in 1 J. MADISON, LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 492 (Philadelphia 1865). See also
Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1156 (1986); and Kelly, Criminal
Libel and Free Speech, 6 U. KAN. L. REV. 295, 306 (1958).
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provoking rebellion among the troops, was tried and acquitted by a military court, but was not
released until Jackson lifted his proclamation of martial law in March of 1815.10
Practically all of the other military trials of civilians during wartime resulted in
convictions.11
The Civil War
Perhaps the first big test of American civil liberties came during the Civil War.
Most of the substantial opposition to the war was effectively controlled by way of
executive orders rendered by President Lincoln – who reasoned that, since the expressed threat to
the Union was military in nature, it could be addressed in the same way as the military conduct
of the war.12
The President believed that survival of the Union rested in part on security for the
nation’s capital in Washington, D.C. Railroad bridges north of Baltimore had already been
burned. Lincoln summoned troops from the northeast to Washington and, in April of 1861,
authorized the commanding general of the U.S. Army, Winfield Scott, to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus (that is, the right of a suspect to be brought promptly before a judge who could
determine the sufficiency of the evidence against him) wherever “necessary…for the public
safety” along any military line between Philadelphia and Washington.13 Seeking to guard against
further destruction of the railroad line through Baltimore, Lincoln declared that political
criminals could be tried before military tribunals. By October of 1861, suspension of habeas
corpus had been expanded to “anywhere between Bangor, Maine, and Washington;” by August

10

REHNQUIST at 70.
Id. See also Eric L. Muller, All the Themes But One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395, 1418 (1999).
12
Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, U. OF PA. L. REV. 975 (1968).
13
REHNQUIST at 25.
11
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of 1862, suspension of the writ was nationwide and extended to both draft resisters and “persons
arrested for disloyal practices.”14 In addition, the postal service put restrictions on what it
deemed “treasonable correspondence.”15
In September of 1862, Lincoln issued a proclamation providing that persons
“discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice
affording aid and comfort to rebels” should be subject to “martial law and liable to trial and
punishment by courts-martial or military commissions.”16 Thus, suspects were denied access to
civil courts and subjected to military trial procedures on charges not otherwise allowable. At
about the same time, another executive order directed U.S. marshals and local police chiefs to
arrest and imprison “any person or persons who may be engaged, or in any way giving aid and
comfort to the enemy, or in any other disloyal practice against the United States.”17 As a result,
more than 13,000 Americans were jailed without trial.18
The lawfulness of Lincoln’s new system of justice was soon tested in civil courts. In late
May of 1861, a man named John Merryman was arrested and imprisoned for participating in the
destruction of the railroad bridges during a riot in Baltimore. His attorney applied for a writ of
habeas corpus from Chief Justice Roger Taney, but military officials refused to produce
Merryman. Justice Taney ruled that the President, acting alone, did not have the authority to

14

See REHNQUIST at 60.
See H. NELSON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT, 221-47 (1966); J. RANDALL,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (rev. ed. 1951); D. SPRAGUE, FREEDOM UNDER LINCOLN (1965). See
also 1 T. EMERSON, D. HABER, & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 35-38 (3d ed.
1967).
16
REHNQUIST at 60.
17
Id. at 75, 83-85.
18
Emerson, supra note at 980.
15
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suspend habeas corpus – reasoning that since the federal courts were open and functioning,
civilians could only be detained and tried by civilian courts.19
President Lincoln responded in a message sent to a special session of Congress: while the
Constitution did not express which branch of government could suspend the writ of habeas
corpus, he argued, when Congress was not in session during an emergency such authority was
vested in the President. The writ expressed “such extreme tenderness of the citizens’ liberty,” he
argued, that it was dangerous to national security. During a period of war the president could not
follow Taney’s advice, he said, and allow “all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated.”20
As it turned out Merryman never did have a trial, but he was eventually released from
prison on bail.
Nevertheless, the administration continued to limit free speech by arresting those who
expressed sympathy for the South. The State Department went so far as to keep a record book
entitled “Arrests for Disloyalty.” Even more extreme, in the summer of 1861, a dozen or more
legislators were arrested to prevent them from enacting an ordinance of secession for the state of
Maryland.21
Nor did the press escape governmental regulation.
Although reporters continued to pursue news of the war, and many of them had access to
the front lines, military generals could exclude them either temporarily or permanently. Indeed
19

Id. at 26-38.
Lincoln in a Special Session Message to Congress (July 4, 1861), 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 25 (J. Richardson, comp.). Lincoln was responding to Chief Justice
Taney's conclusion that only Congress is authorized under the Constitution to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
“when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 9; see Ex parte
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (1861).
21
See REHNQUIST at 45-6.
20
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at one time or another they were routinely banished by both Northern and Southern generals.22
For example, General Sherman expelled every newspaper correspondent from the lines and
threatened “summary punishment” to anyone who would reveal his troops’ movements.23
Similarly, military censors exercised their authority – shutting down, for example, the Chicago
Times for its attacks on President Lincoln.24
The Lincoln Administration was especially concerned about the New York press, because
of its size and influence. While the Times, Tribune and Herald, all supported the Union war
effort, other newspapers did not. A grand jury investigated over a hundred Northern papers
listed by the New York Journal of Commerce as opposed to “the present unholy war,” and found
five of them to be offensive. As a result, the Postmaster General ordered them excluded from
circulation. The owner of the New York News fought the ban by circulating his paper privately.
The government responded by ordering U.S. marshals to seize all copies of the paper, even
arresting a newsboy. Eventually, the newspaper failed.25
Meanwhile, the pro-war New York papers did nothing to support their competition – nor
was there any outcry about abridgment of their First Amendment rights.

22

On

September

24,

J. MATHEWS, REPORTING THE WARS 34 (1957) at 80-81; M. STEIN, UNDER FIRE: THE STORY OF AMERICAN WAR
CORRESPONDENTS 21 (1968) at 18; B. WEISBERGER. REPORTERS FOR THE UNION 105-06 (1953).
23
Randall, The Newspaper Problem in Its Bearing upon Military Secrecy During the Civil War, 23 AM. HIST. REV.
303, 318 (1918) (citing S. BOWMAN, SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS 447-48 (1865)). Apparently the order
continued for some time; Sherman had a reporter excluded from all Union lines for violating the order in 1863. Id. at
318-19. Eight correspondents accompanied General Sherman on his march through Georgia to the sea, however. P.
KNIGHTLEY, THE FIRST CASUALTY – FROM CRIMEA TO VIETNAM: THE WAR CORRESPONDENT AS A HERO,
PROPAGANDIST, AND MYTH MAKER 28 (1975).
24
Everette E. Dennis, et al., The Media At War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict, GANNETT FOUND REP.,
June, 1991, at 9. On June 1, 1863, General Ambrose Burnside deployed troops to stop publication of the Chicago
Times. Kenan Heise, Banned Books Week Carries on Free Speech Fight, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 1985, § 14, at 38.
Lincoln revoked the order as soon as he learned of Burnside's promulgation. Id. See also Paul G. Cassell,
Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations: The Right of Access, Grenada, and “Off-the-Record Wars,”
73 GEO. L. J. 934 (1985) and C. Robert Zelnick, The Press and National Security: Military Secrets and First
Amendment Values, 1 J.NAT’L SECURITY L. 21, 23 (1997).
25
REHNQUIST at 46, 63-64.
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1862 – two days after the publication of the Emancipation Proclamation – President Lincoln
himself issued another directive which provided that anyone caught “discouraging volunteer
enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to
rebels” would be subject to “martial law and liable to trial and punishment by courts-martial or
military commissions…”26 Six months later, in mid-April of 1863, General Ambrose Burnside
(commander of the Department of Ohio) promulgated an order which stated in part: “The habit
of declaring sympathies with the enemy will no longer be tolerated in this department. Persons
committing such offenses will be at once arrested with a view to being tried as above stated [by
military commissions] or sent beyond our lines and into the lines of their friends.”27
That same month a man named Clement Vallandigham, speaking at a rally at the state
Democratic convention in Columbus, Ohio, criticized Burnside’s order and denied the
government’s right to try civilians before military commissions. He traveled around the state,
defending the right of the people to assemble to debate the administration’s war policy. General
Burnside discovered Vallandigham’s itinerary, and sent a dozen “observers” to take notes.28
When Vallandigham returned to his home several days later, he was arrested and charged with
“publicly expressing . . .sympathies for those in arms against the Government of the United
States, declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the
power of the Government in its effort to suppress the unlawful rebellion.” The charge went on to
say that Vallandigham had declared that “the present war is . . . wicked, cruel and unnecessary . .

26

Id. at 60.
Id. at 63.
28
Id. at 65-66.
27
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., one not waged for the preservation of the Union, but for the purpose of crushing our liberty and
to erect a despotism. A war for the freedom of the blacks and enslavement of the whites.”29
The next morning Vallandigham was tried before a military commission comprised
entirely of General Burnside’s subordinates. Not surprisingly, he was found guilty of violating
the General Order. He was sentenced to imprisonment for the duration of the war. His petition
for a writ of habeas corpus (arguing that it had not been suspended in Ohio) was denied by the
United States District Court.30 Vallandigham petitioned the Supreme Court to review the
decision. In February of 1864, the Court refused, holding that it had no jurisdiction to review
decisions of a military commission.31
President Lincoln came under heavy criticism for what had become known as the
Vallandigham Affair. He attempted to ameliorate the situation by changing Vallandigham’s
sentence from imprisonment for the duration of the war to banishment “beyond the Union lines”
into the Confederacy.32 But both “Peace Democrats” and “War Democrats” drafted a letter to
the President denouncing the arrest and trial as a violation of Vallandigham’s constitutional
rights. Lincoln defended the trial, arguing that the country was facing a rebellion and was
29

Id. at 66.
Id. at 66-67.
31
Ex Parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wallace) 243 (1863).
Even Justice Rehnquist, who generally advocates judicial deference to the military in times of war,
questions this result:
Vallandigham was not only tried by a military commission, rather than a jury, but the charge upon which
he was tried was that he violated an order issued by Burnside—an order that forbade the expression of
sympathy for the enemy. A criminal trial in a civil court must be based on a charge that the defendant engaged
in conduct prohibited by an Act of Congress (in a federal court), or by an act of a state legislature (in a state
court). Burnside’s order had no such pedigree; it was not even based on an orderof the President or the
Secretary of War. It originated with Ambrose Burnside, the commanding general of the military district of
Ohio. Members of the armed forces are naturally accustomed to being governed by such orders. But
Vallandigham was not a soldier; he was a civilian. . . .The justification for convicting Vallandigham was
Lincoln’s proclamationof September, 1862, invoking martial law. But what is martial law? Much has been
written both before and after this time in an effort to describe this regime, but in fact the nation had only
limited exposure to it between the close of the Revolutionary War and the Civil War.
32
Id. at 63
30
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therefore under military rule; he characterized Vallandigham’s speech as a direct threat to the
military, undermining the effectiveness of the draft and thereby of the army itself.
“Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts,” asked Lincoln, “while I must
not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?”33
Lincoln’s defense of his actions was not addressed to the constitutional lawyers or
professors but to the general public, which may explain how such an infringement on a citizen’s
freedom of speech could occur.

The question remains whether Lincoln’s actions would pass

constitutional muster had they occurred fifty years later, when the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence began to take shape.34
Lincoln also prohibited any trade with the Confederacy, and required all individuals
desiring such commerce to apply for a permit from the Department of the Treasury.
Subsequently, although the Mississippi River was an important western trade route to both the
North and the South, in the summer of 1861 both sides took steps to stop commercial traffic.35
The Union’s trade policies shifted frequently from prohibition to encouragement, with the
result that individual civil liberties could easily be lost in the shuffle.
For example, after Union forces occupied Memphis, the town was soon flooded by a
wave of northern merchants, many of them who happened to be Jewish. Union military leaders
expressed their frustration with trade that they felt undermined their military goals.36 In response

33

REHNQUIST at 73.
See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 298 [NEED YEAR] (citing
Schenck v. United States., 249 U.S. 47 (1919)).
35
Joseph H. Parks, A Confederate Trade Center Under Federal Occupation: Memphis, 1862 to 1865, 7 J § HIST.
289, 290 (1941).
36
See Letters from Ulysses S. Grant to Mary Grant (Dec. 15, 1862) and to Christopher Wolcott (Dec. 17, 1862) in
JOHN SIMON, ED. 7 THE PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT 43-4 and 56 (1979).
34
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Ulysses S. Grant, commander of the Union forces, issued his now-famous General Order
Number 11:
I.

II.

III.

The Jews, as a class, violating every regulation of trade established by
the Treasury Department, and also Department orders, are hereby
expelled from the Department.
Within twenty-four hours from the receipt of this order by Post
Commanders, they will see that all of this class of people are furnished
with passes and required to leave, and any one returning after such
notification, will be arrested and held in confinement until an
opportunity occurs of sending them out as prisoners unless furnished
with permits from these Head Quarters.
No permits will be given these people to visit Head Quarters for the
37
purpose of making personal application for trade permits.

Jewish community leaders complained bitterly and tried to get the measure rescinded.
They sent a letter to Lincoln protesting Grant’s “inhuman order, the carrying out of which would
be the grossest violation of the Constitution and our rights as citizens under it, (and) which will
place us…as outlaws before the whole world.” The leader of the delegation, Cesar J. Kaskel,
traveled to Washington, D.C. to speak with the president himself.38
Lincoln gave Kaskel and audience, and was persuaded that General Order Number 11
should be rescinded. As the President later put it, he “did not like to hear a class or nationality
condemned on account of a few sinners.”39 (During his subsequent campaign for the presidency,
Grant received numerous letters asking him to explain General Order Number 11. He expressed
great regret about having issued it, and said he was wrong to have done so.)40
In October 1864, Union General Alvin Hovey ordered the arrest of a group of men led by
Lambdin Milligan for conspiracy against the United States. They were charged with giving “aid
and comfort to rebels, inciting insurrection, disloyal practices, and violation of the laws of
37

General Order No. 11 (Dec. 17, 1862), in SIMON, ED., GRANT PAPERS 50.
BERTRAM KORN, AMERICAN JEWRY AND THE CIVIL WAR 121-22 (1951).
39
Id. at 125. This episode is not mentioned by Rehnquist. See supra notes _____ and accompanying text. See
generally Muller, supra note 9 at 1421-23.
40
See 7 THE PAPERS OF ULYSSES S. GRANT, DECEMBER 9, 1862 – MARCH 31, 1863, 50 (John Y. Simon ed., 1979).
38
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war.”41 Milligan and the others were tried and convicted – largely on the basis of evidence
which would have been of questionable admissibility in a civil court – and were sentenced to
hang. Their counsel filed petitions for habeas corpus, contending that a military commission
could not impose sentences on civilians living in a state not at war.
The petition found its way to the Supreme Court.42 In Ex Parte Milligan, the government
argued that the military commission was empowered by martial law, and that its decisions could
be reviewed only by military authority. The Bill of Rights, it said, represented “peace provisions
of the Constitution, and, like all other conventional and legislative laws and enactments, are
silent amidst arms, and when the safety of the people becomes the supreme law.”43
The petitioners urged that the government’s claim be rejected, arguing that martial law
could be imposed only by necessity, and even then only by Congress.

In April of 1866, the

Court ordered that the writ should issue, holding that a military commission had no jurisdiction
to try and sentence Milligan and his co-conspirators. Habeas corpus could be suspended, said
the Court, only in accordance with Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution: “Martial law cannot
arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real,
such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.”44 As the petitioners
had requested, the Court denied the government’s contention that the Bill of Rights was
suspended in time of war or rebellion.45

41

See generally Rehnquist at 123-27 (citing U.S. v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812)). Hudson held that “the
legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it and declare the court that
shall have jurisdiction of the offense” prior to prosecution in federal court. In effect, Hudson abolished federal
common law crimes in the United States.
42
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, at 1 (1866). The procedural history is briefly explained before the opinion begins.
43
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 20.
44
Id. at 127.
45
Id. Thus the Milligan decision is “justly celebrated for its rejection of the government’s position that the Bill of
Rights has no application in wartime. It would have been a sounder decision, and much more widely approved at
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Except for the brief Spanish-American War, which lasted but a few months and was not
fought on American soil, for almost fifty years after the Civil War the United States was at peace
and threats to civil liberties virtually non-existent.

The Twentieth Century
World War I
Restrictions on anti-war expression during the first World War were both widespread and
intensive.
Following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in June of 1914, a
month of threats and counter-threats took place between the Allied and Central Powers,
culminating in Germany’s invasion of France in August of 1914. The initial reaction of the
American public was one of isolationism. There had, after all, been no invasion of or attack on
American soil. Even after German submarines sank the Lusitania and three U. S. merchantmarine vessels without warning, and President Woodrow Wilson (with Congress’s approval
declared war, public opinion was divided.46
Wilson was critical of foreign-born American citizens who opposed the “pro-British
foreign policy.” In a message to Congress on December 7, 1915, he said:
The gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been
uttered within our own borders. There are citizens of the United
States, I blush to admit, born under other flags but welcomed by
our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and
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opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty
into the very arteries of our national life.47
Shortly thereafter, in June of 1917, Congress passed the Espionage Act. Together with
various amendments embodied in the Sedition Act, it criminalized any interference with military
operations as well as any acts causing “insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty.”
The Acts also banned from the mail any material “advocating treason, insurrection, or forcible
resistance to any law of the United States.”48
These laws were vigorously enforced, resulting in substantial suppression of speech. For
example, it became criminal to advocate heavier taxation instead of bond issues, to state that
conscription was unconstitutional (though the Supreme Court had not yet held it valid), to say
that the sinking of merchant ships was legal, to urge that a referendum should have preceded our
declaration of war, or to declare that war was contrary to the teachings of Christ. In addition,
people were punished for criticizing the Red Cross and the Y.M.C.A. Under the Minnesota
Espionage Act it was held a crime to discourage women from knitting by suggesting that “no
soldier ever sees those socks.” Almost two thousand prosecutions were brought under the federal
statutes, and there were many others under state legislation.49
It was through these cases that the Supreme Court’s first thorough analysis of the First
Amendment began, a jurisprudential evolution that has continued to the present day.
Before 1917, the Court had never had occasion to decide a case in which it was claimed
that the federal government had violated the First Amendment by abridging the freedoms of
speech or press. The Espionage Act changed that status quo. Although no decisions were
47
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rendered until after the war was over, in each case thereafter the Court saw fit to reject various
First Amendment claims, usually by applying the “clear-and-present-danger” test.
The first decision to invoke that standard was Schenck v. United States. Together with
other members of the Socialist Party (of which he was general secretary), Schenck had
distributed a leaflet opposing the war and the draft, some copies of which had reached men who
had been conscripted. Schenck and his comrades were indicted under the Espionage Act for
conspiring to obstruct recruiting and cause insubordination in the armed forces.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, speaking for the Court on the First Amendment issue,
wrote: “It may well be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not
confined to previous restraints.”50 But he made it clear that the First Amendment did not protect
all utterances. “The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. . . .The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”51
In upholding the convictions, Justice Holmes explained:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants
in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within
their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends
upon the circumstances in which it is done… When a nation is at
war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so
long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected
by any constitutional right.52
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Other cases went even further in sanctioning curtailment of wartime expression under the
Espionage Act of 1917. Eugene V. Debs, the Socialist leader, was prosecuted for creating
insubordination in the armed forces on the basis of a speech in which he denounced the war as a
capitalist plot and supported fellow socialists who had been convicted of resisting the draft.
Apparently his most extreme statement was, “You need to know that you are fit for something
better than slavery and cannon fodder.” Debs was given a ten-year sentence.
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the conviction, finding that the speech was
designed to obstruct recruitment, because its meaning was “so express” that that goal would be
“its natural and intended effect.”53
The officers of a German-language newspaper were found guilty of violating the
provision against false news reports in publishing articles slanted toward the German position.
Victor Berger’s Milwaukee Leader was denied second-class mailing privileges for printing
editorials, strongly pro-German in tone, attacking the war and the draft.54
Meanwhile, on the battlefields, reporters’ access to the front lines was rare and news
reports were heavily censored. This was due in part to the creation of the Committee on Public
Information in 1917 by the State, Navy, and War Departments. News correspondents in Europe
were required to be accredited, and such status could be revoked for violating censorship
regulations. For example, the press was not permitted to report on the failure of supplies to reach
American troops in Europe, because the War Department believed that such stories would
disturb the nation’s confidence in the war effort.55
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In 1919, after a terrorist bomb exploded at the home of U.S. Attorney General A.
Mitchell Palmer, the Justice Department responded by launching the infamous Palmer Raids, in
which thousands of immigrants across the country were rounded up and hundred of them
deported – not for their involvement in the attack, but for their political associations.56
In Abrams v. United States, the Court held that even advocating a labor strike could be
unlawful under the 1918 Sedition Act, because of the risk that it would stop production of
munitions. The defendants had thrown leaflets, calling for a general work stoppage, out of a
window and onto the street. The Court stuck firmly to the position that any interference with the
war effort could validly be suppressed – although it was in this case that Justices Holmes and
Brandeis began to express dissenting views regarding wartime speech.57
In 1917, the Espionage Act was also challenged for denying second-class mailing
privileges to any newspaper violating its provisions.

Postmaster General Albert Burleson

determined that various articles published in the Milwaukee Leader were intended to interfere
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with the success of United States military operations and obstruct the recruitment and enlistment
services, and revoked the paper’s second-class mailing privileges.58
The Supreme Court upheld another conviction brought under the Espionage Act in Pierce
v. United States. The defendants had been charged with distributing anti-war pamphlets entitled
The Price We Pay, which stated that “our entry into [the war] was determined by the certainty
that if the allies do not win, J.P. Morgan’s loans to the allies will be repudiated, and those
American investors who bit on his promises would be hooked.”59 Justices Brandeis and Holmes
dissented:
The fundamental right of free men to strive for better conditions
through new legislation and new institutions will not be preserved,
if efforts to secure it by argument to fellow citizens may be
construed as criminal incitement to disobey the existing lawmerely, because the argument presented seems to those exercising
judicial power to be unfair in its portrayal of existing evils,
mistaken in its assumptions, unsound in reasoning or intemperate
in language.60

World War II
Although the assertion lingers that during World War II there was no overt effort by the
government to suppress public criticism of wartime policy,61 the evidence suggests otherwise.62
In June of 1940, for example, Congress made it a crime for anyone –
with intent to interfere with, impair, and influence the loyalty,
morale, and discipline of the military and naval forces of the
United States [to] advise, counsel, urge, and cause insubordination,
58
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disloyalty, mutiny, and refusal of duty by members of the military
and naval forces of the United State, [or] to distribute and cause to
be distributed written and printed matter advising, counseling, and
urging insubordination, or to conspire to commit any of the said
prohibited acts.63
Even before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and America’s formal entry into World
War II, the America First Committee – well-known for its outward disapproval of United States
involvement – found itself under grand-jury investigation for opposing American engagement.64
David Dellinger and his anti-war organization People’s Peace Now were harassed and
investigated for opposing the war. The Black press also found itself threatened by J. Edgar
Hoover and Attorney General Francis Biddle for publishing articles critical of the war effort.65
In October of 1941, two months before the attack at Pearl Harbor, the commander of the
Military Department of Hawaii, Lt.Gen.Walter Short, urged passage of a state law to grant the
governor extraordinary powers in the event of war.

The territorial governor of Hawaii, Joseph

Poindexter, called a special session of the legislature, which quickly enacted the Hawaii Defense
Act.66 That law implemented Section 67 of the Hawaii Organic Act, the charter of the territory
enacted by Congress in 1900, which provided that the Governor “may in case of rebellion or
invasion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, suspend the writ of
habeas corpus or place the territory or any part thereof under martial law until communication
may be had with the President and his decision thereon made known.”67
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Within a few hours of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Poindexter signed an order
placing the territory under martial law and suspending the writ of habeas corpus.68 General Short
assisted him in this effort by issuing his own proclamation, which declared his intention to push
for legislation that would establish censorship and regulate blackouts, meetings, possession of
arms, and the sale of intoxicating liquors. Offenders would be sentenced by military tribunals or
held in custody until the civil courts could resume their normal functions.69
The Supreme Court also confronted the question of civil liberties for non-citizens – an
question very much in issue today – in deciding whether captured German saboteurs could
constitutionally challenge the President’s power to order them tried by a military tribunal. The
petitioners were eight Germans caught as they tried to enter the country for the purpose of “. . .
sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations under the law of war.”70 They argued
that under the Constitution they had a right to demand a jury trial at common law in the civil
courts.71
The Court held that the President had authority under the Constitution to order the
petitioners tried before a military tribunal as unlawful belligerents under the Articles of War. In
a per curiam opinion (which kept the facts from the public), the Court unanimously found in
favor of the government.72
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At the subsequent military trial all eight men were convicted and sentenced to death.
Five days later six of them were executed by electric chair. The Supreme Court later issued a
full opinion later, but not before several behind-the-scenes exchanges in which Justice
Frankfurter exhorted his colleagues to yield to the President as a matter of patriotism and penned
a bizarre soliloquy with the already-executed men: “You damned scoundrels have a helluvacheek
to ask for a writ. . . . You’ve done enough mischief already without leaving the seeds of a bitter
conflict involving the President, the courts and Congress. . . . [Y]our bodies will be rotting in
lime . . . [and] remain in . . . custody and be damned.” He also encouraged his brethren not to
engage in “abstract constitutional discussions” but to leave any unresolved issues to be decided
“during peacetime.”73
Equally shocking, perhaps, was a statement attributed to President Franklin Roosevelt
who, it has often been suggested, did not order bombardment of the Nazi death camps because he
was worried about being perceived as fighting a war for the Jews. He is said to have told two
members of his cabinet (Treasury Secretary Henry Morganthau, who was Jewish, and Leo
Crowley, director of the Office of Economic Welfare, who was Catholic, both of whom were
urging him to intervene on behalf of the Jews) that “you should remember, this is a Protestant
country, and you Jews and Catholics are here under sufferance. You have to go along with
everything I want.”74
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The Japanese Internment Camps
The most serious abrogation of civil liberties during wartime – and perhaps in all of U.S.
history – involved the internment of the Japanese-Americans during World War II. This long
and painful episode provides a useful basis for analyzing the validity of “military necessity” as a
justification for limiting individual rights under the Constitution.
Even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese-Americans were the targets of racism.
In 1905, an “Asiatic Exclusion League” was formed to keep Japanese and Koreans from
immigrating into the United States.

In 1907, President Roosevelt negotiated the so-called

“Gentlemen’s Agreement,” under which the Japanese government would not issue passports to
people seeking to live in America, but the United States would permit parents, wives, and
children of laborers already in the U. S. to immigrate. Similar racism was reflected in the WebbHartley law of1913, which limited leases to three years to aliens that were unable to become
citizens.75
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the newspapers were filled with propaganda of Japanese
subversion and traitors.76 One Honolulu newspaper reported that Japanese-American farmers
had planted their tomatoes in a configuration that would point to American airfields around Pearl
Harbor.77 Although no Japanese planes were ever sited, 1,400 rounds of ammunition were fired
at supposed Japanese enemy planes.78
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In February of 1942, General John DeWitt, recommended to Secretary of War, Henry L.
Stimson to evacuate all west coast Nikkei (Issei and Nisei collectively):79
[The Japanese race] is an enemy race and while many second and third generation
Japanese born on American soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have
become ‘Americanized,’ the racial strains are undiluted. . . . The very fact that no
sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that
such action will be taken.80
DeWitt had little sympathy for the argument that few if any of the Nikkei posed a security
threat. In his words, “A Jap is a Jap.”81 Roosevelt told Stimson to “go ahead [and do what he]
thought the best”82 and shortly thereafter, the President signed Executive Order 9066.83 This
directive gave DeWitt the legal power to exclude any and all persons, citizens or aliens, from
designated areas on the West Coast.84 Subsequently about 112,000 people, including 70,000
American citizens, were ordered to “relocation centers.”85
Internment camps, which the government called “relocation centers,” were established in
Manzanar and Tule Lake, California; Topaz, Utah; Rivers, Arizona; Heart Mountain Wyoming.86
Privacy was non-existent in the internment camps. A family was given a 20- by 25-foot space.87
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Toilets were communal; diarrhea was common, caused by contaminated water.88 Each internee
received a straw mattress, blanket, and very little else for space that resembled a horse stall.89
Justice Rehnquist’s description of the internees’ experience itself is misleadingly brief:
“There was no physical brutality, but there were certainly severe hardships – physical removal
from the place where one lived, often forced sale of houses and businesses, and harsh living
conditions in the Spartan quarters of the internment centers.”90
Although the internment caps were not as harsh as those seen in Nazi Germany, their
impetus was similar: the Japanese-Americans were being punished for being born into an
unpopular race.91 Physical abuse was not uncommon. In 1943, as a response to riots, internees
at Tule Lake were beaten, kicked, and sprayed with tear gas.92 After the war, each internee was
given $25 and a train ticket to the place he once called home.93
For their part, the interned Nikkei could not understand why the government had placed
them in detention camps, much less behind barbed wire. But even more puzzling to them was
why in 1944 several hundred Nisei interns were ordered out of the relocation centers and into the
U.S. Army – the same Army that continued to guard their parents and their brothers and sisters.
Why would the same government that had evacuated them as military risks now want them to
serve?
At least some of the incentive to draft Nisei out of the camps appears to have come from
a segment of the Japanese-American community itself. In June 1942, the War Department
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changed the selective service classification of the Nisei-American citizens all to IV-C, the
category for “aliens not acceptable to the armed forces.”94 Almost immediately, an organization
called the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) began lobbying the government to allow
Nisei to volunteer and join the military in order to demonstrate their loyalty.95

This idea

appealed to Dillon Myer, the director of the civilian War Relocation Authority that had been
created in November of 1942 to administer the interment camps.96 He too began pressing for the
right of Nisei to volunteer.97
In January 1943, the War Department agreed – with the proviso that volunteers be
screened to determine if their loyalty was questionable. A questionnaire was distributed to
young men in all ten of the relocation centers and soon expanded to include all evacuees, Issei
and Nisei.

The four-page survey, entitled “Application for Leave Clearance,”included two

pointed questions:
#27. Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat
duty wherever ordered?
#28. Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and
faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces,
and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, to any other
foreign government, power or organization?98
The Nisei, having been interned for almost a full year now, were concerned that a “yes”
answer to Question 27 would be tantamount to volunteering to join the armed forces and leaving
their parents and siblings to fend for themselves in the camps. They were also chagrined by
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Question 28: how could they “forswear” an allegiance to the Japanese Emperor to whom they
had never sworn allegiance in the first place?
But the loyalty questionnaires did ultimately serve to cull volunteer Nisei, many of whom
served on the segregated 442d Regimental Combat Team. As stories of their bravery in battle
made their way back to the United States late in 1943, the JACL began lobbying the War
Department to reopen the draft to the Nisei as well, and to force into the service the
overwhelming majority of their compatriots who had no intention of answering the army’s call
for volunteers.99 By mid-February of 1944, induction notices began to appear in the mail at all
ten relocation centers, including Tule Lake.100
The drafting of the Nisei were greeted in the camps with a measure of disbelief. Issei
parents, who had already lost their homes, their livelihoods, their security, and their dignity, were
now to lose their sons as well. Residents of all of the camps complained about the unfairness of
the government’s decision simultaneously to incarcerate and to draft the very same community
of people.101
Although most of the young men who received draft notices complied with their orders
and showed up for their physical exams, some draftees refused to comply.

If we are loyal

enough to serve in the army, they asked, what have we been doing in concentration camps for the
last year and a half?102 The resisters were quickly indicted for failing to comply with the draft,
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arrested by the FBI, and taken to jail. All of them found themselves charged with felonies and
facing the possibility of additional years of incarceration.103
Their cases came to trial in the summer and fall of 1944. Most of the federal district
judges hearing them ran perfunctory trials, and meted out sentences of from two to five years in
prison.104
One notable exception occurred in July of 1944. Judge Louis H. Goodman of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California was assigned the prosecution of
twenty-seven young men from the Tule Lake Relocation Center who had refused to show up for
their physicals.
The resisters and their court-appointed attorneys faced an uphill battle. Public feeling was
strongly against them; the local newspaper referred to them as “the Japanese” or “American-born
Japs.”105
The defendants were advised by their attorneys to plead guilty as charged, which they
did.106

Judge Goodman, however, asked another attorney to file a motion to quash the
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indictment as violative of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause. He also filed a motion to
withdraw the guilty pleas that had already been entered.107
Unlike every other federal judge that summer, who had tried the Nisei draft resisters and
convicted them, Judge Goodman bluntly dismissed all charges against the defendants. The “war
powers vested in the executive,” he said, “may be sufficient constitutional justification” for the
internment itself. But “[n]osuch dangers are the basis for the prosecution of defendants for
refusing to be inducted.”108
“It does not follow,” said Judge Goodman, “that because the war power may allow the
detention of the defendant at Tule Lake, the guaranties of the Bill of Rights and other
Constitutional provisions are abrogated by the existence of war.” Applying the basic test of due
process, Goodman found it shocking to the conscience that an American citizen be confined on
the ground of disloyalty, and then, while so under duress and restraint, be compelled to serve in
the armed forces, or be prosecuted for not yielding to such compulsion. “The issue raised by this
motion must be resolved in the light of the traditional and historic Anglo-American approach to
the time-honored doctrine of due process. It must not give way to overzealousness in an attempt
to reach, via the criminal process, those whom we may regard as undesirable citizens.”109
The government did not appeal Goodman’s decision. The defendants were returned to
their relocation center where, despite their victory in court, they resumed their lives behind
barbed wire.110
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*
During the internment years, other legislative actions likewise affected thousands of
Japanese- Americans. In 1943 California passed a statute which prohibited “aliens ineligible to
citizenship” from earning their living as commercial fishermen in coastal waters.111 Well after
the war ended, Congress saw fit to provide partial restitution for losses and damages resulting
from the internment. The Evacuation Claims Act, however, was not a cure-all. While losses by
Japanese-Americans were estimated to be around $400 million, only ten percent of this amount
was disbursed to former internees.
In 1981 Congress established a special commission to investigate the historical, legal,
economical, and psychological impacts of the forced internment of over 120,000 persons of
Japanese ancestry.112
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One fisherman’s suit went all the way to the Supreme Court, which ruled that the statute was unconstitutional.
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unconstitutional. Legal obstacles to land purchases by Asians were thus removed.
112

Japanese-Americans have also endured informal discriminatory practices. In 1945, a Japanese-American family
challenged the constitutionality of segregated schools, and the Los Angeles County Superior Court concurred that
segregation on the basis of race or ancestry violated the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1947 the California legislature
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Supreme Court Cases
The internment of Japanese-Americans gave rise to the most important and controversial
cases decided by the Supreme Court during World War II.
As the war progressed, various restrictions were relaxed. Some Nisei had volunteered for
military service and fought in Europe; other internees received permission to relocate to the
eastern and Midwestern United States. All remaining internees were released by the beginning
of 1945, three years after their evacuation, when the Supreme Court held that the continued
detention of loyal citizens against their will exceeded the scope of Executive Order 9066 and its
implementing statutes.113
These regulations resulted in four cases reaching the Supreme Court: United States v.
Hirabayashi,114 and Korematsu v. United States,115 and Yasui v. United States116 and Ex Parte
Endo.117

All involved children of Issei parents. The Court upheld the convictions in

Hirabayashi, Korematsu and Yasui without addressing the bases for the claims of military
necessity.118
United States v. Hirabayashi challenged both the curfew and the subsequent relocation.
Gordon Hirabayashi was born in Seattle, and attended the University of Washington. In May
1942, Hirabayashi disobeyed the curfew established by the President’s Executive Order, and two
deceased members of the highly decorated 442nd Combat team were returned to the United States after World War
II, some cemeteries refused to allow them grave-sites solely because of their ancestry.
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days later failed to register for evacuation. He was indicted and convicted in a federal court in
Seattle on two misdemeanor counts, and was sentenced to imprisonment for three months on
each count.119
Hirabayashi asserted that the Executive Order was unconstitutional. The case was heard
by the Supreme Court in late spring of 1943, while world war was still being waged. The Court
declined to address the constitutionality of the relocation, but (by an 8-0 vove) it upheld the
curfew.

In so doing it gave the government great deference in exercising its war-making

authority:
We cannot close our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by experience,
that in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an
invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a
different ancestry. Nor can we deny that Congress, and the
military authorities acting with its authorization, have
constitutional power to appraise the danger in light of facts of
public notoriety. In this case it is enough that circumstances within
the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for
maintaining the national defense afforded a rational basis for the
decision which they made. Whether we would have made it is
irrelevant.120
Minoru Yasui was born in the United States and became a lawyer and a member of the
Oregon bar. Yasui violated the curfew order applicable to Portland, where he resided. He was
convicted in the federal court in Portland and was sentenced to imprisonment for one year. As
in Hirabayashi, the Court narrowed the scope of review to the issue of the curfew – which it
unanimously upheld.121
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A year after Hirabayashi, the Court heard both Korematsu and Endo, each of which
attacked the legality of the relocation.
Fred Korematsu, also born in the United States, was convicted of remaining in San
Leandro, California, and thereby violating a military-exclusion order. A federal court in San
Francisco overruled his claim that the orders in question were unconstitutional, suspended his
sentence, and placed him on probation for five years.122
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, in the process reaffirming the constitutionality
of the government’s forced relocation of Japanese-Americans.

Relying heavily on

Hirabaysahi’s deference to the military in a time of war, the Court gave short shrift to the
arguments that many of those targeted were full-fledged U.S. citizens who posed no
demonstrable threat to national security, had not committed any crimes, and quite likely had been
singled out solely because of their race:
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference
to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses
the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the [the West Coast]
because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because
we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly
constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West
Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures,
because they decided that the military urgency of the situation
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from
the West Coast temporarily. We cannot by availing ourselves of
the calm perspective of hindsight now say that at that time these
actions were unjustified.123
Ex Parte Endo was decided when hostilities were coming to an end, and America’s
military superiority was manifest. The issue in this case was not a direct challenge to the
122
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regulations, but a writ of habeas corpus claiming that Mitsuye Endo, having proven her loyalty,
could no longer be constitutionally detained at the Topaz Relocation Center in Utah.124
The Court agreed, finding that neither Executive Order 9066 nor its implementing
statutes in any way authorized the incarceration of loyal citizens. “In interpreting a war-time
measure we must assume that their purpose was to allow for the greatest possible
accommodation between liberties and the exigencies of war, that the lawmakers intended to
place no greater restraint on the citizens than was clearly and unmistakably indicated by the
language they used.”125
Applying this approach, the Court found that Executive Order 9066 and Congress’
confirmation of it said nothing about detention after evacuation.

Thus Endo’s continued

detention at an internment center was improper.126
Though the Supreme Court must have fully understood that after the Battle of Midway in
1942 there was little danger of a Japanese attack on mainland United States, it nevertheless
upheld the constitutionality of the internment in November of 1944. How else to fathom the
Court’s rationale, except to point to the fact that the war was still on?
Not all of the wartime cases brought before the Supreme Court, however, were decided in
the government’s favor. In 1944, a civilian ship-fitter in the Honolulu Navy Yard named Lloyd
Duncan was arrested after a brawl with two armed marine sentries, and charged with violation of
a general order prohibiting assault on military or naval personnel.

He was tried over his

objection by a military court, found guilty, and sentenced to six months in prison. In Duncan v.
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Kahanamoku, decided after the end of World War II, the Court focused upon interpreting the
Hawaii Organic Act statute rather than directly addressing the limitations imposed by the terms
of the Constitution.127
The Court in Duncan reaffirmed the general proposition that the judiciary has an
obligation to protect citizens’ constitutional rights even during times of war.128 Congress, said
Justice Black, intended to permit martial law only in times of military necessary. The Organic
Act of Hawaii, in authorizing martial law, did not intend the military organization to supersede
the civilian system any more than necessary.

The Court went on to evaluate the dangers

apprehended by the military at the time White and Duncan committed their respective offenses.
It concluded the military dangers were not sufficiently imminent to require civilians to evacuate
the area or any buildings necessary to carry on the business of the courts. Finally, the Court saw
no military necessity to try a common brawler and a “normal” embezzler before military
tribunals, these offenses bearing no relationship to the military.129
Duncan thus contrasts sharply with Hirabayashi and Korematsu, in which the Justices
upheld the extraordinary discretionary authority exercised by the government in the internment
of Japanese-Americans.130
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The Press in World War II
Restrictions on the press also became more severe during World War II.
Immediately following the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, Congress created the Office
of Censorship, which in turn instituted a Code of Wartime Practice.131 To gain access to the
front lines, a reporter had to be accredited, one of the requirements for which was that he agree to
submit all his work to military officials for censorship.132
In 1942 William Dudley Pelley, Lawrence A. Brown, and the Fellowship Press, Inc, were
convicted of sedition for making anti-government and pro-Nazi statements in their newspaper
Silver Shirt. Pelley was sentenced to fifteen years in prison, Brown to five, and the Fellowship
Press was fined $5000.133
Not all of those tried during wartime were convicted. In 1944, Joseph E. McWilliams
and thirty other defendants were indicted for conspiracy to interfere with, impair, and influence
the loyalty, morale, and discipline of the United States armed forces by printing and distributing
131
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publications advising, counseling, and urging insubordination and refusal of duty by members of
the military and naval forces of the United States. The indictment addressed the origin of the
issue that began with a movement in Germany in 1933 to substitute the existing form of
government in the United States with a National Socialist form by causing insubordination,
disloyalty, mutiny, and refusal of duty by members of the military and naval forces of the United
States.134
The defendants were charged with conspiring in the District of Columbia with one
another, with officials of the German Reich, and with the leaders and members of the Nazi Party.
Furthermore, as part of the conspiracy the defendants and co-conspirators printed and circulated
forty-two specified publications, used thirty-five specified agencies as distributors, and otherwise
disseminated twenty-four specified representations and charges.135
The case went before a jury in April of 1944, and ended in a mistrial some eight months
later as a result of the judge’s sudden death. Thereafter on several occasions various of the
defendants moved for trial, but without result. It was finally dismissed, the court finding that the
defendants had not been accorded their Constitutional right to a speedy trial, and that the statute
of limitations had passed.136
Nor did censorship always end in conviction. In 1944, for example, James Omura, the
editor of Rocky Shimpo, a Japanese newspaper in Denver, published editorials critical of the
federal government’s decision in January of that year to open the military draft to the Nisei
internees. Omura was arrested and tried for conspiring to counsel others to evade the draft,
134
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although his sole contribution to the conspiracy were the opinions he voiced in his column.137 A
federal jury acquitted him, although his career as a journalist was adversely affected.138
In 1944 Elmer Hartzel was convicted under the 1917 Espionage Act for anonymously
mailing to military leaders his writings “depict[ing] the war as a gross betrayal of America,
denounc(ing) our English allies and the Jews and assail[ing] in reckless terms the integrity and
patriotism of the President of the United States. Even though the Court said that it was aware “of
the fact that the United States is now engaged in a total war for national survival and that total
war of the modern variety cannot be won by a doubtful, disunited nation in which any
appreciable sector is disloyal,” it nonetheless reversed Hartzel’s conviction for insufficient
evidence.139

McCarthyism and the Korean War
Following World War II, it was not long before the “Red Scare” overtook much of the
popular press – fueled in large measure by Senator Joseph McCarthy. His anti-Communist
witch-hunts, coupled with the machinations of the House Un-American Activities Committee,
served to roil up both citizens and politicians.140 Only later would “McCarthyism” – which has
since been defined as the persecution of innocent people by sensational but unproven accusations
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– become recognized as one of the worst abuses of constitutional civil liberties in American
history.141
Congress had passed the Smith Act in 1940, which made it a crime to advocate violence
against the government. The Act was little used until the McCarthy era, when the fear of
communism led to the prosecution of Communist and Socialist party officials. In Dennis v.
United States,142 leaders of the Communist Party were indicted under §3 of the Smith Act for
“willfully and knowingly conspiring (1) to organize as the Communist Party a group of persons
to teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by
force and violence, and (2) knowingly and willfully to advocate and teach the duty and necessity
of overthrowing and destroying the Government of the United States by force and violence.”143
The Supreme Court deferred to executive and legislative power in upholding the
convictions of individuals who merely studied communism. The purpose of the Act, said the
Court, was “to protect existing Government, not from change by peaceable, lawful and
constitutional means, but from change by violence, revolution and terrorism.”144 The Court
further justified use of the Smith Act:
141
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Those who recognized the excesses of McCarthyism early on were relatively few. One was Learned Hand,
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unpopular political groups is said to be a very large part of the rationale for the free speech guarantee. In reality, of
course, politics cannot be avoided by deploying the tricks of the constitutional lawyers’ trade. Grand rights claims in
venerable documents merely divert the course of political energy into the courtroom, where the forces of the State
reconstitute themselves dressed in the garb of constitutional necessity. The judges read the political runes as best
they can, often without realizing that this is what they are doing, and express what their instincts tell them in the
only language available to them, constitutional law.”)

44

It is within the power of the Congress to protect the Government of the United
States from armed rebellion and is a proposition which requires little
discussion. . . . No one could conceive that it is not within the power of
Congress to prohibit acts intended to overthrow the Government by force and
violence.145
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Black argued that the Smith Act was
unconstitutional. “Violence is rarely, if ever, stopped by denying civil liberties to those
advocating resort to force,” he wrote.146 “Once we start down that road we enter territory
dangerous to the liberties of every citizen.”147
The provision authorizing the deportation of immigrants for membership in the
Communist Party was not removed until 1991,148 although its substance resurfaced in
1996 as part of the Congressional Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.149
Today the prevalent view is that the Supreme Court failed effectively to confront
the excesses of the McCarthy era.

Dennis has been called “disastrous” and

“shameful.”150 Justice Frankfurter’s opinion was labeled by one of his own biographers
as a “judicial abdication of responsibility.”151 In fact, all of the Justices in Dennis have
been similarly criticized.152

145

Dennis, 341 U.S. at 501.

146

Id. at 590.

147

Id. at 581.

148

Hunter, supra note ____at ___ .

149

Id. This Act was designed as a response to the Oklahoma City bombing, and allowed for the deportation
of immigrants on the basis of “secret evidence.” See generally Melissa K. Mathews, Restoring the Imperial
Presidency: An Examination of President Bush’s New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y
455 (2002).
150

MICHAEL E. PARRISH, JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE SUPREME COURT, IN THE JEWISH JUSTICES OF
THE SUPREME COURT REVISITED: BRANDEIS TO FORTAS 61, 77 (Jennifer M. Lowe ed., 1994); RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 148 (1977); see also HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF
POWER AND RIGHT: HUGO BLACK, WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
145 (1992) (stating that the Court in Dennis was “not sensitive to the preservation of freedoms for political
deviants”).
151

MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 116
(1991).

152

MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME
45COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 70 (1966).

45

Yet the notion that the Dennis decision was simply ill-considered is likewise
misplaced, because it ignores the idea that most cases reflect the tenor of the times.
When Dennis was decided in 1951, McCarthyism was at its peak. Within the preceding
two years, mainland China had become a Communist state, the Soviet Union had
detonated its first atomic bomb, and North Korea had invaded South Korea. Alger Hiss,
a former State Department official, had been convicted of perjury. Ethel and Julius
Rosenberg had been executed for passing nuclear secrets to the Soviets. The Red Scare
was in full bloom.153
Elected in 1946, McCarthy believed that by the 1950’s the highest levels of
American government, including the State Department, had been infiltrated by
communists, who were causing various failures in American foreign policy. He made
this claim most famously in a 1950 Lincoln Day speech in Wheeling, West Virginia – in
which he professed to know, without any apparent evidence, the names of 205
Communists working in the State Department.154
Internal investigations were nevertheless conducted by various liberal
organizations – such as the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the NAACP, and the
American Jewish Committee – which subsequently expelled members alleged to be
communists.155 In 1954 Hubert Humphrey – the liberal co-founder of Americans for
Democratic Action – proposed legislation to outlaw the Communist Party.156 Against
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this backdrop, it is unrealistic to expect that a majority of the Supreme Court could have
denied the constitutionality of loyalty oaths, anti-communist investigations, or criminal
prosecutions

for

subversion.157

Although the American Civil Liberties Union and some journalists – notably
Edward R. Murrow – fought strongly against McCarthyism, the general paranoia about
the evils of communism diluted their opposition. Many lawyers hesitated to defend
liberal-minded clients.158 But even the ACLU

was divided over whether to regard

Communist Party affiliation as protected by the First Amendment.159 Until the early
1960's, in fact, the ACLU itself included a strong anti-communist disclaimer in every
brief it filed.160
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A Senate investigation later dismissed McCarthy’s claims about Communists in
the State Department as fraudulent.161
In May of 2003, Congress released some of the theretofore-secret archives of the
Senate’s permanent subcommittee on investigations. McCarthy, it turns out, preferred to
screen witnesses prior to their appearance in open session so that he could weed out those
who were more combative and articulate. He chose only those who gave the impression
of being weak or confused, or who would cast doubt on their veracity by invoking their
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Nevertheless, despite repeated threats
that witnesses who refused to cooperate would be jailed for perjury, none of them ever
were. But dozens of them, including 42 Army engineers, lost their jobs after testifying.162

Vietnam
The Supreme Court’s disposition on civil liberties during the Vietnam era was
varied. On the one hand, the Court upheld the conviction of David Paul O’Brien for
burning his draft card on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse, in the process
rejecting his claim that he was merely engaging in political expression protected by the
First Amendment. The Court refused to accept O’Brien’s contention that the motivation
behind the statute forbidding destruction of draft cards was to suppress anti-draft and
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anti-war speech, instead ruling that the law served the government’s legitimate interest in
maintaining an effective selective-service system.163
On the other hand, in New York Times Co. v United States (the “Pentagon Papers”
case),164 the Court rejected the government’s efforts to halt publication in the Times and
the Washington Post of a stolen, top-secret military report detailing the history of
American military involvement in Vietnam. Here, the government contended publication
of the document would compromise ongoing military operations and peace negotiations,
and was likely to endanger the lives of American soldiers in battle or captivity. But the
majority of the Court concluded that the First Amendment rights of the newspapers and
their readers were superior to the military concerns.165
In Cohen v. California166 and Gillette v. United States,167 both decided during the
Vietnam War, the Court refused to enforce laws which prohibited speech condemning the
draft and the rights of religious objectors. Indeed, it was at the height of Vietnam and of
the Cold War when the Court finally overruled Whitney v. California,168 rejecting the old
criminal-syndicalism laws and permitting the government to punish those who advocated
illegal action only if their speech is intended (and is likely) to produce “imminent lawless
action.”169
Thus, the Court found that general opposition to the war or defense effort, no
matter how strongly expressed, is constitutionally protected.
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expression might be seen or heard by members of the active armed forces, or might have
some detrimental effect on recruitment or the draft, is not sufficient to deny First
Amendment protection.
This point was underscored in the 1966 case of Bond v. Floyd.170 Julian Bond had
been elected to the Georgia House of Representatives, but the state legislature refused to
give him a seat because of his statements opposing the draft and criticizing American
policies in Vietnam. At that time Bond was communications director of the Student NonViolent Coordinating Committee, which had issued a strong statement opposing the war:
We believe the United States government has been deceptive in its
claims of concern for freedom of the Vietnamese people, just as the
government has been deceptive in claiming concern for the freedom of
colored people in such other countries as the Dominican Republic, the
Congo, South Africa, Rhodesia, and in the United States itself.
We maintain that our country’s cry of “preserve freedom in the
world” is a hypocritical mask behind which it squashes liberation
movements which are not bound, and refuse to be bound, by the
expediencies of United States cold war policies. We are in sympathy with,
and support, the men in this country who are unwilling to respond to a
military draft which would compel them to contribute their lives to United
States aggression in Viet Nam in the name of the “freedom” we find so
false in this country.
We therefore encourage those Americans who prefer to use their
energy in building democratic forms within this country. We believe that
work in the civil rights movement and with other human relations
organizations is a valid alternative to the draft. We urge all Americans to
seek this alternative, knowing full well it may cost their lives as painfully
as in Vietnam.171
The Court unanimously held that the refusal to seat Bond violated his First
Amendment rights: “Certainly there can be no question but that the First Amendment
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protects expressions in opposition to national foreign policy in Vietnam and to the
Selective Service system.”172
This position stood in stark contrast to the Court’s early First-Amendment
jurisprudence, especially as expressed in the World War I-era cases of Schenk and Debs.
While much of that evolution took place in circumstances not involving wartime dissent,
Bond confirmed the current more expansive reading of free-speech guarantees against
national-security claims. Although the Court simply declared that the statement in Bond
was protected (without reference to clear-and-present-danger or balancing criteria), it did
articulate the idea that free and open debate of wartime policies and regulations is
essential to the life of a democracy.173
Thus, by the mid-1960's a general right to express strong dissent to war and
defense policies had come to be broadly tolerated. Even if the government chooses to
disregard or reject the opposition, it recognizes the inevitability of such protest in a
society that aspires to remain democratic. By now the issue was no longer the right of
open dissent, but the extent to which the First Amendment protects expression
specifically urging resistance to the Selective-Service laws, and the proper Constitutional
line to be drawn between “expression” and “action” in various forms of protest.174
The draft-card burning cases of the 1960’s focused directly on the difficulty of
separating governmental control of expression from governmental control of action.
Although the Selective Service Act did not then specifically prohibit the intentional
destruction of draft cards, it did require all those registered to have their cards in their
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possession at all times.175 Violation of this regulation was punishable by a fine of
$10,000 and/or imprisonment for five years.176 In 1965, Congress passed an amendment
to the Selective Service Act which provided that anyone who “knowingly destroys [or]
mutilates” a draft card is subject to penalties under the Act.177
Following passage of this amendment, the number of draft-card burnings
increased and several prosecutions ensued. All of the courts involved, however,
concluded that draft-card burning is expressive conduct that comes within the purview of
the First Amendment. All of them relied upon the balancing test – with one court
balancing in favor of First Amendment rights178 and three others against.179
Meanwhile, expression urging or advising resistance to the draft was on the
increase. In September of 1967, for example, a group of 320 ministers, professors, and
writers signed a document entitled “A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority,”180 in which
they recounted various methods of resistance to the war being used by different persons,
including the refusal to be inducted. “We believe that each of these forms of resistance
against illegitimate authority is courageous and justified.”181 The U.S. Conference on
Church and Society, including Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish leaders, issued their own
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public statement: “We hereby publicly counsel all who in conscience cannot today serve
in the armed forces to refuse such service by non-violent means.”182
Although anti-war protests were widespread, they were generally tolerated as
constitutional free speech. Nevertheless, dissent was stifled by way of various forms of
harassment from the executive and legislative branches of government.

For example,

while President Johnson acknowledged the right of citizens to protest, he also let it be
known that he “was dismayed by the demonstrations” and he gave his “full endorsement
to the Justice Department’s Investigation of possible Communist infiltration of the antidraft movement”;183 and he said that the Federal Bureau of Investigation “was keeping an
eye on anti-war activity.”184 Former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach told a news
conference that “the Justice Department [has] started a national investigation of groups
behind the anti-draft movement,” adding that “[t]here are some Communists involved in
it; we may very well have some prosecutions.”185 Six months later the national secretary
of the Students for a Democratic Society said that there “seems to be a national
investigation” of his organization by the F.B.I.186

There was also evidence that

opposition to the Vietnam war was being taken as unfavorable evidence in loyaltysecurity investigations.187
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Similar expressions have been made by numerous
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Similar assaults upon wartime dissent came from Congress. Many legislators
denounced opposition to the war as disloyal conduct.188 In 1965, the Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee made public a staff report which attacked a number of individuals
as having “persistent records of Communist sympathies and/or of association with known
Communists and known Communist movement and front organizations,” and asserted
that the antiwar demonstrations had “clearly passed into the hands of Communists and
extremist elements.”189 The named individuals were not given the opportunity to reply.
In March of 1967, the House Committee on Un-American Activities issued a
report on a protest scheduled for April known as Vietnam Week, the theme of which was
stated as follows: “The real objective of Vietnam Week is not the expression of honest
dissent to promote the best interest of the American people and their Government, but to
do injury and damage to the United States and to give aid and comfort to its enemies.”190
Other forms of harassment included harsh physical interference by police officers
against anti-war demonstrators, as well as intimidation (e.g., photographing of persons
participating in peaceful antiwar marches and vigils). There were also attempts by draft
boards to accelerate the induction of antiwar demonstrators have also occurred.191
Summarizing the situation in June 1967, the American Civil Liberties Union said:
[T]o applaud the fact that dissent has not been muted, despite the rising
emotionalism of the Vietnam War, is not to say we may relax the civil
libertarians’ vigil. There are signs, ominous signs, that a storm is brewing.
188
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The random collection of incidents attached to this statement illustrate[s]
the steadily accelerating strains on unpopular expression. Such instances
show that dissent is now the object of official and private intimidation and
harassment. Unless these, and others, are vigorously and courageously
opposed, unless the right and importance of dissent are re-affirmed and
defended, the nation could slip back into a new era of McCarthyism with
its dangers to a free society – fear, conformity, and sterility.192

In January of 1968, the Constitutional issues involved in this form of expression
were raised by the indictment of five members of the group which had issued “A Call to
Resist Illegitimate Authority.193

The defendants – Rev. William Sloane Coffin, Jr.,

Michael Ferber, Mitchell Goodman, Marcus Raskin, and Dr. Benjamin Spock – were
charged with conspiracy to “counsel, aid and abet diverse Selective Service registrants
[to] refuse and evade service [and to] fail and refuse to have in their personal possession
registration certificates and notices of classification [draft cards],” as required by the
Selective Service regulations; and with conspiracy to “hinder and interfere” with the
administration of the Selective Service Act, all in violation of section 462(a).194
*
Ironically, contrasted with past censorship, the Vietnam War provided the press
with an unprecedented opportunity for freedom. Throughout the conflict, accredited
journalists had almost unfettered access to the wartime theatre – even permitted to ride
along with military transports. They faced virtually no censorship. In return, the military
simply asked that the press refrain from reporting items such as planned offensive and

192

American Civil Liberties Union, The Vietnam War and the Status of Dissent, June 4, 1967.

193

A CALL TO RESIST ILLEGITIMATE AUTHORITY and DECLARATION OF CONSCIENCE AGAINST THE WAR IN
VIETNAM, supra at note 178.
194

Indictment, United States v. Coffin, Crim. No. 68-1-F 55
(D. Mass., Jan. 5, 1968).

55

troop movements.

In fact only a handful of violations of the limited guidelines

occurred.195
Nevertheless, the Vietnam War resulted in a significant deterioration in pressmilitary relations, in large part because reporters began to mount their own opposition to
the war. Increasingly, the media were filled with negative stories concerning the United
States’ war effort, such as the widespread use of napalm and Agent Orange.196 The
media’s distrust and cynicism was likewise inflamed after the Joint U.S. Public Affairs
Office started regularly to manufacture victories and exaggerate enemy casualties.197
After the war, large numbers of servicemen were left with a sense that the press
was biased, sympathetic to the enemy, and ultimately responsible for the loss of public
support for the war. Young soldiers from Vietnam would eventually take commanding
positions in the military, and in later conflicts their memories and impressions of an
unpatriotic press would serve to shape the military’s restrictions on the media.198

Grenada
In 1979, a bloodless coup led by Maurice Bishop took place on the Caribbean
island of Grenada, and the new ruling junta began to develop increasingly strong military
and economic ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union. Four years later, in 1983, Bishop
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was deposed and executed; martial law was imposed, and Grenadan troops were ordered
to shoot any curfew violators.199
In October of 1983, faced with a growing threat to Americans and American
interests in Grenada, the United States and six neighboring nations sent troops into the
island.

The only resistance they faced came from about 1000 Cuban construction

workers/militiamen, who held out for two days.200
The invasion occurred in almost total secrecy, because – for the first time in
American history – reporters were completely excluded from observing any part of the
military operation.201

The government enforced the news blackout by refusing to

transport the press to Grenada, turning away chartered press boats, and removing any
reporters who had already reached the island.202 During this period, the only news about
Grenada to reach the American public came from the Pentagon and the White House.203
The press were not granted access to the island until the civilian airport reopened –
eleven days after the fighting ceased.204
Officials in the Reagan administration and in the military offered several reasons
for the news embargo.
199

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger claimed that the

Christopher C. Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion,
78 AM. J. INT’L L. 131-150 (1984).

200

Why the Surprise Move in Grenada – and What Next?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 7, 1983, at 3233. See also Cody, Information Out of Sync, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 29, 1983, at A11, col. 4; Why the
Surprise Move, supra note____ ; and N.Y. TIMES, Oct 30, 1983, at E1, col. 4.
201

See Steven S. Neff, The United States Military vs. The Media: Constitutional Friction, 46 MERCER L.
REV. 977, 991 (1995); Kevin P. Kenealey, The Persian Gulf War and the Press: Is There a Constitutional
Right of Access to Military Operations?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 287, 316 (1992); and Humphrey Taylor, Some
Positive News for a Change: Confidence in Leaders of Institutions Improves Somewhat, The Harris Poll
1996 #10, at 1, 2-3.
202

Coverage Efforts Thwarted, 8 NEWS MEDIA L., 2, 6 (1984); How the Pentagon and the Press Can Call a
Truce, WASH. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb., 1984, at 22, 23; U.S. Troops Remove 4 Reporters,
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 27, 1983, at A1, col. 4-5.
203

Cody, supra note_____at A11, col. 1.

204

Flynt v. Weinberger, 588 F. Supp. 57, 58 (D.D.C. 1984).
57

57

invasion force was not large enough to insure the safety of the press – and that he simply
complied with the wishes of the military commander who did not want press coverage of
the operation. General John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
defended the press exclusion on the ground that the success of the mission depended on
the element of surprise. Retired Vice Admiral William Mack speculated that the military
force was already at sea when the government decided to invade: “You couldn’t put the
press aboard without a difficult flight to the ships.”205
But this explanation rings hollow. Although n the past the government and the
press, working together, have insured operational security and secrecy without resorting
to a total news ban,206 members of the press do not seek a guarantee of safety when they
cover wartime news.

The obstacles to providing for press coverage of the Grenada

operation were no more severe than those encountered during previous military
operations.207
The media reacted angrily to the exclusion policy in Grenada. Editorials in daily
newspapers condemned the news blackout,208 and commentators contrasted the Grenada
experience with the freedom of access to war stories that reporters have had in earlier
conflicts.209 Ten news organizations released a statement calling for the government to
“reaffirm the historic principle that American journalists” should be present at U.S.
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military operations,” and to guarantee that future “military plans should include planning
for press access.”210
Meanwhile (in November 1983), General Vessey established the Media-Military
Relations Panel to develop proposals for future press coverage of military conflicts.211
This commission, named the “Sidle Panel” after its chairman (retired Major General
Winant K. Sidle), was comprised of representatives from journalism schools, the military,
and the press.212 The Sidle Panel sent questionnaires focusing on press access and
censorship to major news organizations,213 and held hearings at which the news media
asserted that the press has a right, grounded in both the First Amendment and historical
practice, to cover wartime news. Some organizations opposed censorship in any form.
Most press representatives acknowledged the need for military accreditation of
reporters.214
Although the government claimed to recognize the public’s right to information
about military operations, it emphasized the need to strike a balance between the public’s
right to information and the military’s security concerns.

Particular concern was

expressed about television news coverage and the attendant risk of compromising
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operational security. “On-scene review before transmission” was suggested, together
with accreditation of reporters by the Pentagon in order to discourage sensational or
inaccurate coverage.215
The Sidle Panel concluded that “it is essential that the U.S. news media cover
U.S. military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security
and the safety of U.S. forces.”216 The panel recommended development of a press-pool
system for combat zones in remote or otherwise inaccessible areas, under which selected
members of the press would be formed into small groups (“pools”) and allowed to access
restricted areas on the condition that they share their information with excluded
colleagues. However, the panel emphasized that the pools would only be used in the
initial stages of combat, not as the principal means of coverage.217
The panel also recommended that the military develop “security guidelines”
governing press coverage of operations (violation of which would result in a reporter
being excluded from the operation) and that the Pentagon expand programs designed to
improve media-military communications and understanding.218
In October 1984, the Defense Department announced that it had created a press
pool that could be assembled on short notice to cover military operations. Although the
goal was provide for full coverage within twenty-four to thirty-six hours, the decision to
extend the use of press pools beyond that period would rest with the operation
commander. In a departure from past practice, the military, rather than the news media,
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would select the news organizations that would participate in the pool.219 The Pentagon,
however, reserved the right to decide against bringing the press on a particular military
action.220
Although some members of the press criticized the vagueness of the report and
the institution of a pool system, initial media response to the Sidle panel’s report was
favorable. The press agreed to the pool arrangement primarily to get access to the front
line. They formed a group to stand by in readiness for any military operation.221

The Persian Gulf War
Although the press-pool idea had been used in Panama in 1989 – where news of
the operation immediately leaked and the military criticized the media’s inability to keep
the mission a secret222 – the Persian Gulf War was the first major conflict to test the pool
system.223
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, which immediately requested assistance
from the United Nations. In mid-January of 1991, a coalition of U.N. forces (led by the
United States) attacked both Iraqi forces in Kuwait and military targets in Iraq. Over the
next seven weeks, Americans witnessed instantaneous media coverage of the conflict –
including that from a CBS news team which drove to the front line and was captured by
219
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Iraqi soldiers, and from a CNN correspondent who broadcast live from behind enemy
lines.224
In general the public believed it was being told the truth about Operation Desert
Storm, and did not consider the reports of stunning, virtually casualty-free victories for
the coalition, as anything but factual. By contrast (Americans were told) the Iraqi people
were deliberately misled by a government-controlled media, which were publishing false
accounts of great losses by the coalition forces.225
Hindsight affords the opportunity to examine more accurately the U.S. military
censorship that did take place. Saudi Arabia, it turned out, was described as one of the
most hostile nations in the world to the notion of press freedom.226

The Pentagon

interceded on behalf of the American press corps to demand and secure visas and
transportation into the war zone.227 In exchange, the press agreed to certain rules of
conduct and guidelines:228 the media were told what information could not be reported
because it might jeopardize operations and endanger lives, their reports were subjected to
security review prior to release, and access to the front line was restricted to one member
of the media pool.229

224

Malcolm W. Browne, The Military vs. the Press: A Correspondent’s Account, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
1991, º6 (Magazine), at 27, 45; Edwin Diamond & Jeanie Kasindorf, How CNN Does It: Winning the TV
Gulf War, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at 30, 32; William Prochnau, If There’s A War, He’s There, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1991, º 6 (Magazine), at 30, 31.
225
Morrow, The Fog of War, TIME, Feb. 4, 1991, at 16. See also Duffy, The One Hundred Hour War, U.S.
NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Mar. 11, 1991 at 11; Wicker, An Unknown Casualty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
1991, at A29, col. 5; Zoglin, Volleys on the Information Front, TIME, Feb. 4, 1991, at 45; and Barry, A
Textbook Victory, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 11, 1991, at 38.
226
John R. MacArthur, Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War 4 (1992).
227
Marianne D. Short & Jodene Pope, History and Scope of the Press’ Right of Access to Foreign
Battlefields, NAVAL L. REV. 1, 2 (1993).
228
Office of Ass’t Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Operation Desert Shield Ground Rules (Jan. 14,
1991); Office of Ass’t Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Guidelines for News Media (Jan. 14, 1991).
229
A pool included a representative from each news medium. Office of Ass’t Secretary of Defense (Public
Affairs), CENTCOM Pool Membership and Operating Procedures (Jan. 30, 1991). Each medium
controlled its own pool members. Id. Membership in a 62
pool rotated every two or three weeks. Id. To be

62

The number of reporters allowed into the pool was tightly limited.230 Even pool
reporters were highly restricted in the scope of their coverage. Virtually ignored was one
of the Sidle Panel’s principal recommendations – that pool coverage be limited to those
situations where it is the only feasible way of getting reporters to the scene.
The Pentagon chose not to publicly release any negative footage, only videos
illustrating the unfailing accuracy of the bombs.

Throughout Desert Storm, briefing

officers were able to craft the impression of a high-tech war operation, cultivating the
perception that its firepower seldom missed the target – in general, telling the public only
what they wanted it to know.231 In contrast to the sensational photographs and video
offered up at press conferences, after the conflict ended the Pentagon disclosed that the
much-ballyhooed “smart bombs” made up only seven percent of the U.S. explosives
dropped on Iraq and Kuwait. While the smart bombs were ninety-percent accurate, the
81,980 tons of conventional bombs were merely twenty-five-percent accurate.232
Similarly, it came to light that restrictions had been placed on images of
recognizable casualties, scenes of fighting, or anything resembling a religious
observance.233 Only thirty-eight of the 1,104 Operation Desert Storm photographs in
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America’s three major news-magazines showed actual combat activity. Overall, there
was virtually no coverage of the ground war until it was over.234
Meanwhile, journalists who tried to function outside of the pool system were
often detained or denied access completely. “[W]e didn’t have the freedom of movement
to make an independent assessment of what the military is all about,” said one reporter.
“Everything was spoon fed.”235 Another said that he “had more guns pointed at me by
Americans or Saudis who were into controlling the press than in all my years of actual
combat.”236 The pool system was called “a disaster,” “dysfunctional,” and “a smoothly
functioning dictatorship.”237 According to various media spokes-people, the restrictions
made it impossible for reporters and photographers to tell the public the full story of the
war in a timely fashion. Yet, the military continued to use pool coverage and enforce its
restrictions for nearly every facet of Desert Shield and Desert Storm.238
The disagreement between the press and the military during Operation Desert
Storm mirrored the arguments of the past. The media complained that the command was
stingy with information, that whatever was disclosed was varnished to such a high public-
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relations gloss that the accuracy was suspect, and that government censorship was
preoccupied with style and packaging as opposed to substance.239
Numerous courts and commentators have recognized that, even if the press has no
constitutional right of access to the front line in a foreign war zone, an informed citizenry
is essential to a democracy. As the Supreme Court has put it, “[P]aramount among the
responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from
deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and
foreign shot and shell.”240 In seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of
the public at large.”241
This function is even more important when there is a foreign conflict. Then, it
becomes essential that the government be “vigorously and constantly cross-examined, so
that the fundamental issues of the struggle may be clearly defined, and the war may not
be diverted to improper ends, or conducted with an undue sacrifice, of life and liberty, or
prolonged after its just purposes are accomplished.”242 Press access, in the broadest
terms, permits the public to serve as a check on executive power, foreign policy, and the
military.243
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On the other side, the command accused the media of being petulant,
meddlesome, and recklessly unsympathetic to the realities of military operations.244
It can be seen that the competing considerations bearing on the press’ right of
access in times of war – we do not want to compromise our military efforts, yet we want
to be kept honestly informed – were on classic display. American strategy called for a
large-scale ground attack from an unpredictable direction – a plan later credited with
having enabled the coalition to retake Kuwait without suffering heavy casualties.245
Obviously, if the press had reported this maneuver in advance, the critical element of
surprise could have been severely compromised.246
Dissatisfied members of the media challenged the government’s system of
restraints in court. In Nation Magazine v. United States Department of Defense247 the
complaint was dismissed as moot and too abstract. Past injury alone, according to the
court, “is not sufficient to merit the award of relief against future conduct.”248
The quick and apparently successful conclusion of the Persian Gulf War served to
preserve the Supreme Court’s policy of delicate avoidance. In the future, it is likely the
Court will still have to address once again the difficult issue of military censorship. If it
is to remain consistent with the standing principals on prior constraint, the Court will
have to place a heavy burden of persuasion on the military. On the other hand, the desire
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not to interfere with successful war-waging might compel the Court to relax the burden –
thereby weakening the policy against government censorship that lies at the core of the
First-Amendment protection for the press.249
Prior restraints deal with speech, and the right of access deals more with conduct.
There are strong arguments that the media’s claim of a right of access involves more
“conduct” than “speech,” and is therefore outside the protection of the First
Amendment.250 The Supreme Court has often relied on this distinction, in several cases
holding that the press’ news-gathering activities are subject to regulation because they do
not directly involve speech.251
This debate will likely resurface each time America becomes involved in war.252

The Rehnquist Thesis
The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist weighed in with his own analysis of the
status of American civil liberties during wartime in his 1998 book, All the Laws but One.
However, its underlying premise – that there are times when civil liberties must be
subordinated to national security – is flawed.
Rehnquist contrasts Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War
with restrictions authorized by Congress during World War I, when the executive branch
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under Woodrow Wilson was granted powers to punish and silence subversive speakers.
Although the latter period saw no trials of civilians before military courts (and an
increased involvement of the civil courts in the adjudication of individual-rights claims),
Rehnquist concludes that the Wilson administration had the same instinctive desire to
suppress harsh criticism of the war effort as had Lincoln’s administration during the Civil
War.253
According to Rehnquist, the Court’s reluctance to countermand the government
during wartime is inevitable, even desirable. In an interview following publication of his
book, he speculated on what he might have decided to do under similar circumstances:
I think one of the most difficult things in the world to do, is
to second-guess people who were in leadership positions at
that time. . . . . [I]t’s very easy, in the atmosphere of the
late 1990s, to say something was a very bad thing to have
done. But so far as criticizing people who were in
leadership positions at that time, you’ve got to realize they
operated under the ethos and the standards of the times in
which they lived.254
The Chief Justice points out that these military officials were not entrusted with
the protection of anyone’s civil liberties, but to make sure that vital areas were as secure
as possible from espionage or sabotage. The traditional unwillingness of courts to decide
constitutional questions unnecessarily serves to illustrate the Latin maxim, Inter arma
silent leges: “In time of war the laws are silent.”255
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Nor is Rehnquist especially concerned about the evacuation and internment of the
Issei, who “were both by tradition and by law in a quite different category” from their
citizen children, the Nisei. “Distinctions that might not be permissible between classes of
citizens must be viewed otherwise when drawn between classes of aliens.” Due to
genuine fears of Japanese attack and invasion of the West Coast, and because the Issei
were so concentrated in that area, the Chief Justice argues that the government was
justified in relocating them.256
If the courts are prone to judicial reluctance during wartime, would it not be better
to withhold a decision until after the war when they would be more inclined to follow
judicial norms? We must recognize, says Rehnquist, the human factor that inevitably
enters into even the most careful judicial decision.257 But Rehnquist makes no apologies
for treating civil liberties differently during time of war:
In any civilized society the most important task is
achieving a proper balance between freedom and order. In
wartime, reason and history both suggest that this balance
shifts to some degree in favor of order – in favor of the
government’s ability to deal with conditions that threaten
the national well-being. . . . And if we feel free to criticize
court decisions that curtail civil liberty, we must also feel
free to look critically at decisions favorable to civil
liberty.258

For example, Rehnquist compares the internment of Japanese-Americans with the
less restrictive treatment of German-Americans and Italian-Americans. The Issei, he
says, were tightly concentrated along the West Coast, where Japanese military activity
fortunes of war were vastly improved.
256
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was feared – whereas Germans and Italians were more dispersed along the East Coast,
where the perceived danger was the sinking of ships rather than bombings or troop
invasions. This, though it was on the East Coast where two groups of Nazi soldiers did in
fact infiltrate the mainland United States with the goal of attempting sabotage, and did so
with the assistance of American citizens of German descent.259
In other words, according to Rehnquist, the government decided to
evacuate/intern all Japanese-Americans living on the West Coast for essentially military
reasons.260
Rehnquist cites various judicial declarations to make clear that the government’s
authority to infringe upon civil liberties is greatest in time of declared war.261 “When a
nation is at war many things which might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to
its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight,” wrote Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes) in Schenck.262

“Otherwise impermissible ethnic or racial

distinctions may be permissible during wartime,” said Chief Justice Harlan Stone in
Hirabayashi.263 “A society in which men recognize no check upon their freedom soon
becomes a society where freedom is the possession of only a savage few,” observed
Judge Learned Hand.264
Besides his assertion that the balance between an individual’s interest in freedom
and the government’s interest in order must shift during wartime in favor of the
government; Rehnquist concludes that there is no reason to think future wartime
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presidents will act differently from Lincoln, Wilson, or Roosevelt. Also, future Justices
will decide questions no differently from their predecessors – avoiding or narrowing their
interpretation of the Bill of Rights until after the crisis is over. And this, according to
Rehnquist, is an altogether desirable result.265
*
The primary problem with Rehnquist’s thesis is that it is based upon a highly
filtered reading of history, one that fails to recognize or assess the extent of the harms
done that later proved needless.
For example, in discussing Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil
War, he appears unfazed by the fact that suspects could not seek review in civil courts
and were subject to trial by military tribunals for offenses unknown to civil law – that, in
one observer’s words, Lincoln had created an “extra-judicial system of freewheeling
military justice”266
Rehnquist also leaves out events that run counter to his thesis – such as when
Lincoln exempted the Jews of Tennessee from General Grant’s over-reaching expulsion
order. He disapproves of the Court’s decision in Milligan (in which the majority of the
Justices rejected the government’s defense of Lincoln’s wartime regime of military
justice for civilians), saying the court went out of its way to “to declare that Congress had
no authority to do that which it never tried to do.”267
Rehnquist similarly slants Twentieth-Century wartime deprivations of civil
liberties. Describing the internship of Japanese-Americans, he glosses over deprivations
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endured by the internees. He ignores Justice Jackson’s ringing dissent in Korematsu.268
Nor does he adequately address the question of why the East-Coast Italians and Germans
were not treated in a similar way to the Japanese – even though some of the latter were
caught trying to commit sabotage. Nor does he address the fact that that there were no
instances of Japanese subversion on the U.S. mainland.269
Rehnquist also fails to make any mention of other deprivations of civil liberties,
such as the editorial censorship of James Omura’s newspaper, the grand-jury
investigation of the America First Committee, the harassment of Dellinger’s People’s
Peace Now organization, the conviction of William Dudley Pelley and the Fellowship
Press, the indictment of Joseph McWilliams, and the conviction of Elmer Hartzel.270
Similarly, the late Chief Justice ignores or minimizes the Twentieth-Century
wartime victories won by libertarians. For example, Congress refused to ratify Woodrow
Wilson’s proposal to subject a person to up to ten years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine
for publishing anything deemed by the President to be useful to the enemy. Wilson
himself opposed a bill suggested by an assistant attorney general that would authorize
military trials and the death penalty for civilians who interfered with the war effort.271
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Rehnquist likewise chooses to disregard federal judge Louis Kaufman’s opinion
in U.S. v. Kuwabara, chastising the government: “It is shocking to the conscience that an
American citizen [can] be confined on the ground of disloyalty, and then, while so under
duress and restraint, be compelled to serve in the armed forces, or be prosecuted for not
yielding to such compulsion.”272
All the Laws but One says barely anything about the Korean or Vietnam Wars.
Rehnquist gives short shrift to the Pentagon Papers case, in which the Supreme Court
found that the government had not met its burden of proof that there was enough of a
threat to national security to justify prohibiting the Washington Post and New York Times
from publishing wartime documents.273
Not surprisingly, Rehnquist avoids mentioning instances where wartime
Presidents and courts have exercised restraint before limiting liberties, and to decline
discussing non-war situations that likewise threatened the national security.274
How would Rehnquist explain the Court’s pro-speech decisions during the
Vietnam era, when the government was unable to control the widespread anti-war
sentiment that took place around the country? At that time there was substantial domestic
turmoil. The anti-war and anti-draft movements were as vocal as any such movement
during World War I.275
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In short, All the Laws but One might be a good brief supporting his proposition
that in wartime security needs trump individual rights, but it is a bad history. The
political and judicial record on civil liberties in wartime is a good deal more complex
than the simple black-letter case the Chief Justice presents.276
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II. THE “WAR” AGAINST TERRORISM
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the government
instituted a number of measures designed to enhance national security – including a
broad range of espionage activity,277 beefed-up immigration policies and controls,278 the
establishment of an Office of Homeland Security,279 unlimited pre-trial detentions,280 and
secret military tribunals.281 Many of the new practices and procedures were embodied in
the USA Patriot Act of 2002.282
The new regulations and legislation gave rise to serious questions about their
underlying wisdom and reasonableness: the extent to which we should be willing to
sacrifice individual liberties for national security, the justification for increased
governmental spying on law-abiding citizens, and regulatory actions that are unrelated to
terrorism and do nothing to stop it.283
Civil libertarians – both liberals and conservatives (many of whom are
uncomfortable with any governmental intrusion into personal freedoms) – feel that
questioning the actions of an overreaching government is the essence of patriotism. Thus,
wiretapping should be overseen by meaningful judicial review, law-enforcement agents
277
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should notify occupants that homes will be or have been searched, and no one (neither
citizens nor non-citizens, unless the danger they pose to the state can be clearly
demonstrated) should be subjected to indefinite detention.284
In an era when the potential for terrorist acts of mass destruction far more than
theoretical, where should the line be drawn between protection of individual rights and
national security?

Legislative Precursors to 9/11
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
Before passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978, the CIA and
FBI had illegally shared information with one another, creating a great expansion in the
scope of domestic surveillance which resulted in investigations of political candidates,
anti-war protesters, and civil rights leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr.285 Responding to
these perceived abuses of domestic surveillance, particularly during the administrations
of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, Congress sought (1) to regulate domestic
electronic surveillance of foreign intelligence information, and (2) to protect national
security by providing tools by which foreign intelligence crimes could be detected and
prevented.286
Under FISA, the federal government was allowed to conduct electronic
surveillance of “foreign powers” and “agents of foreign powers” for foreign intelligence
information, with judicial approval. To get approval for such surveillance under FISA, a
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high-ranking government official was required to certify to the court that the purpose of
the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information. Courts in turn devised a
“primary purpose” test, which required that the Department of Justice set up a procedure
limiting contact between foreign intelligence agents in the FBI and federal prosecutors.287
Application of the primary-purpose test, along with the policy of the Department
of Justice, resulted in “a wall” that some believe prevented the discovery of intelligence
that may have prevented the 9/11 attack.

Following the events of 9/11, Congress

responded to this concern by amending the original FISA in the Patriot Act, requiring the
government to show that a “significant purpose” (as distinguished from the more
difficult-to-prove primary purpose) of the surveillance is foreign intelligence gathering –
ostensibly allowingfor greater surveillance of American citizens.288

Legislative Responses to 9/11
Prior to 2001 there was some doubt as to whether international terrorism was on
the increase or decrease. In fact the number of terrorist incidents and deaths during the
1990’s declined significantly in comparison with those recorded in the 1980’s.289
All of that changed on September 11, 2001, with the demonically coordinated
suicide attacks via hijacked domestic airliners.290 The simultaneous assaults, carried out
in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia by nineteen avowed terrorists, killed close to
287
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3,000 people and have caused billions of dollars in property damage and insurance
costs.291

Recent Federal Actions Limiting Civil Liberties
The Use-of-Force Resolutions
Both the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization characterized
9/11 as an “armed attack” on the United States. This terminology was purposeful,
signaling that the U.S. regarded the event as equivalent to an act of war under
international law, as it was labeled by the President.292 Accordingly, for the first time in
its history, NATO invoked its collective self-defense clause.293
It followed naturally that on September 12, 2001 the U.S. would turn to the U.N.
Security Council in hopes of obtaining a strong “use-of-force” resolution.294 What it
received instead, however, was a statement of support 295 – which specifically recognized
America’s
“inherent right of individual and collective self-defense in
accordance with the Charter” and called on “all States to
work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators,
organizers, and sponsors of these terrorist attacks.” The
resolution further addressed the issue of responsibility:
“[T]hose responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be
held accountable.”296
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Although Congress elected not to exercise its power to declare war,297 it almost
unanimously passed its own use-of- force resolution, which left no doubt as to its resolve
to authorize the President to use military force if necessary. Among other things, the
Joint Resolution recognized the authority of the President under the Constitution “to take
action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United
States…[and]

to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,

organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons.”298
Thus armed with resolutions from Congress, NATO, and the United Nations, the
President quickly ordered the intelligence community to gather evidence to identify and
locate those who committed the terrorist attacks, and to determine if any international
state entity may have provided support. A substantial body of evidence pointed directly
to the already-notorious al Qaeda – an umbrella organization founded in 1989 by a Saudi
national named Osama bin Laden and Abdallah Azzam, a member of the Palestinian
Moslem Brotherhood299 – and to the ruling Taliban government in Afghanistan.300
From the early 1990s until the end of 2001, al Qaeda, whose expressed agenda is
to “attack the enemies of Islam all over the world,”301 operated openly in Afghanistan
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with the full support of the Pashtun-dominated Taliban.302 Indeed Afghanistan became a
training ground for thousands of Arab and non-Arab al Qaeda militants, including
Kashmiris, Chechens, Uzbeks, Uighurs, and others who were encouraged to infiltrate
numerous other countries for the purpose of carrying out terrorist attacks.303 At the same
time, radical Islamic fundamentalists began to make increasingly bold and public
statements to support their terrorist actions.
The United States gave the Taliban regime an ultimatum: to turn over the al
Qaeda leaders and shut down all terrorist camps in Afghanistan, or be attacked.304 When
the Taliban leadership refused to comply, the U.S. (and its principal ally Great Britain)
used overwhelming military force, which in several months appeared to rout both al
Qaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan.

Since then, al Qaeda has been forced to

revert to clandestine terrorist operations.305
In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush famously characterized
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as “an axis of evil” because of their continuing support and
sponsorship of terrorist groups.306 (The official annual State Department list of nations
considered sponsors of terrorism currently also includes Libya, Syria, Sudan, and
Cuba.307) The President declared that the “United States of America will not permit the
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world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive
weapons.”308
Much of the debate that followed centered around the question of international
law, which justifies the use of armed force only as a means of self-defense: Could the
U.S. go beyond its “War on Terrorism” rhetoric and take military action against those
nations it identifies as rogue supporters of terrorist activities, but which have not actually
physically engaged in an act of aggression against the United States? Would such a quest
be able to sustain the economic costs it would engender, not to mention the perhaps even
greater danger to international peace and security?309
On the one hand, the Supreme Court has amply confirmed the constitutional
principle that, during wartime, the law of survival is paramount – trumping other
fundamental rights to speech, liberty, and property. On the other hand, the Court has
drawn distinctions even where military action is involved. The question of when the
rules of war take effect is complicated, involving more than a simple congressional
declaration. In the current conflict, the Court may be required to distinguish still further
between conducting the domestic “war on terrorism” and law- enforcement actions
against other crimes that also pose a national security threat, such as international drug
cartels and organized crime.310
Can the Supreme Court be convinced a war is being fought if (as in the war
against terror has no foreseeable end?
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Indeed the Court has determined that even serious criminal or economic crises do
not necessarily “increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed
upon power granted or reserved.”311 The “war on drugs,” for example, also has its
paramilitary and international aspects – involving unprecedented resources for
interdiction, heavy criminal penalties for sales, and aggressive profiling and prosecuting
of drug suspects. But while the fight against drug trafficking has been called a “war,” the
Court has determined that it is essentially a law-enforcement program and has thus
prohibited using intrusive technology to detect drug use through people’s walls, or using
race or nationality as factors in profiling drug “mules.” It has also required the same
standards of proof for probable cause in drug violations as for any other criminal
activity.312
The “war on terrorism,” however, while still ostensibly in its infancy, is a new
hybrid of military action and law enforcement. While the enemy may have the same goal
as that of a warring nation – to destabilize the U.S. government and economy and
undermine its citizens’ security for political ends – modern terrorists are not a traditional
enemy with fixed territory and a standing army, but a transnational group of criminals
living both here and abroad who attack private citizens wherever they may be.313
How the Court understands the post-September 11th status of the nation is likely
to affect not only its wartime jurisprudence but also its approach to domestic criminal law
more generally. Justice O’Connor has already suggested as much. “[I]t is possible, if not
likely, that we will reply more on international rules of war than on our cherished
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constitutional standards for criminal prosecutions in responding to threats to our national
security.”314

The USA Patriot Act of 2001
By the end of 2001 America’s complacency in its enjoyment and expectation of
ever-expanding constitutional liberties had been brought to an abrupt end.

Almost

immediately after the President’s post-9/11 declaration of a war on terrorism, lawenforcement agencies began rounding up suspects; close to a thousand of them were
arrested or detained without any formal charges having been filed.315
The new millennium’s first major test of the extent to which the Constitution must
bridge the gap between freedom and security came with the passage of the USA Patriot
Act of 2001.316
The investigative and enforcement provisions of the Patriot Act were sweeping.
Particularly affected were protections against the invasion of privacy. The government
was now permitted to conduct secret searches of homes and offices, and (if it persuades a
judge that the subject might flee or destroy evidence) to copy records without their
owner’s assent. Judicial authority was been expanded to issue a single warrant under
which a “roving” wiretap can be installed on all telephones a suspect uses anywhere

309

Some international lawyers continue to claim that a war cannot be fought against a non-state
organization. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictions in the Proposed Military
Tribunals, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 635 (2002). Cf. Karadzic v. Kadic, 70 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
315

Debora K. Kristensen, 44-Dec Advocate (Idaho) 20, 22, 2001. See infra notes
text.

316

and accompanying

Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) [hereinafter USA Patriot Act]. “USA PATRIOT” is an
acronym for “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism.
83

83

within the United States. Law-enforcement agencies were now allowed to monitor e-mail
and Internet use.317
The Act also required the attorney general to detain non-citizens who he
determines pose a threat to national security until they can be deported, and if their home
country refused to take them back, to detain them until he decides they no longer pose a
threat to national security. All detention and deportation cases involving non-citizens and
certified by the attorney general as national security risks must be heard in federal court
in Washington, D.C. and nowhere else. U.S. intelligence agencies and the military can
share otherwise secret grand jury information in terrorism and national security cases.
And the statute of limitation for terrorism crimes (formerly five years) was lifted
completely.318
The USA Patriot Act provided its own definitions for “terrorist organization,”
“domestic terrorism,” and “international terrorism.” A terrorist organization is any group
designated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist organization, or a group of two or more
individuals that commits, plans, or prepares to commit terrorist activities. Domestic
terrorism is defined as the unlawful use of (or threat to use) violence by a group or
individuals committed against American people or property, or to intimidate or coerce a
government civilian population in furtherance of political or social objectives.
International terrorism involves acts dangerous to human life that violate the criminal
laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a criminal act if committed
therein. International terrorist acts occur outside the United States or transcend national
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boundaries in terms of how terrorist accomplish them, the persons they appear intended
to coerce or intimidate, or the place in which the perpetrators operate.319
Given the tenor of the times, there was little surprise that Congress, in October
2001, quickly passed the USA Patriot Act by an overwhelming margin.320 To appease
whatever legislative opposition was voiced about the Act’s expansive grant of power to
law-enforcement agencies, the Senate agreed to a four-year sunset limitation on its
wiretapping and surveillance provisions.
Not surprisingly, libertarians almost immediately perceived the new law as an
unnecessary threat to fundamental freedoms in the name of national security.
For example, in a mailing to its membership in November 2002, the American
Civil Liberties Union spelled out the reasons for its strong objections – specifically, that
the Act:
(1) allowed for indefinite detention of non-citizens on minor visa violations;
minimizes judicial supervision of federal surveillance (despite fact that judges
deny wiretaps very rarely);
(2) expanded the government’s ability to conduct secret searches; allows delayed
notification in many cases;
(3) permitted sharing of sensitive information in criminal cases with intelligence
agencies without judicial review;
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(4) gave the Attorney General and Secretary of State the power to designate
domestic groups as terrorist organizations and deport any non-citizen who belongs
to them;
(5) granted FBI broad access to sensitive business records about individuals
without having to show evidence of a crime, and to student records based on mere
certification that records are relevant; provides overly broad definition of
“terrorism” (e.g., under the new definitions, acts of simple civil disobedience
could cause groups like People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals to become
targets of “terror” investigations);
(6) allowed the Attorney General summary power to violate the attorney-client
privilege by monitoring communications between those detained by Justice
Department and their lawyers;
(7) established military tribunals to try suspected terrorist that will not be required
to follow same principles of law and evidence required in civilian courts;
(8) silenced dissent by equating criticism with aid to terrorists, and declaring that
public debate would “erode our national unity diminish . . .our resolve . . . give
ammunition to America’s enemies, and pause to America’s friends”; and
(9) allowed the FBI to spy on Americans in their churches, on the Internet, in
bookstores, and in libraries – even if there is no evidence a crime might have been
committed. (Librarians can be charged with a crime if they so much as inform
their patrons that the government has been investigating their reading habits.)321
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Criticism of the USA Patriot Act as unnecessary and overbearing came from other
quarters as well.322

Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe worried that “the twin

[Constitutional] pillars” of checks-and-balances and open public accountability were both
seriously eroded by the new regulations.323
U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft staunchly defended the USA Patriot Act,
emphasizing the need for authorities to be equipped with new powers to detect and
prosecute terrorists:
As terrorists have learned to adapt to the changing tactics of law
enforcement, so, too, have we learned to adapt to the changing
needs of America's domestic security. . . .And among the chief
lessons we have learned in the past ten months is that our ability to
protect the homeland today has been undermined by restrictions of
the decades of the past.324
Ashcroft’s position found its own supporters – even among law professors.
Douglas Kmiec, the dean at Catholic University, argued that the line is no longer clear
between what is criminal and what is terrorist or related to foreign intelligence.
Detaining and trying unlawful combatants in military tribunals may be perfectly
warranted; if anything, the Justice Department’s treatment of terrorist suspects has erred
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too greatly on the side of civil liberties; regular criminal trials are subject to pretrial
gymnastics that are wholly unsuited to a court’s criminal-justice function.325
Oren Gross, while recognizing that the real threat of terrorism will cause
democracies “to embrace and employ authoritarian measures,” nevertheless suggested
that extra-legal measures may be appropriate in “truly extraordinary occasions . . . at
times even violating otherwise accepted constitutional dictates, when responding to
emergency situations.326
William Barr, who served as Attorney General under the first President Bush,
reflected widespread support for the legislation among conservatives:
The danger to our civil liberties comes from the terrorists, . . . not the
government’s actions. I think [those actions] have been restrained,
moderate, well within the law and pose no genuine civil liberties concerns. .
. . The Constitution doesn’t give civil liberties to our enemies. The
Constitution is concerned with us winning the war by either killing or
incapacitating those who are trying to kill us.327

“Patriot II”
By early 2003 the Justice Department had drafted new legislation called the
Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, designed to expand even further the new
government powers for domestic surveillance created by the 2001 USA Patriot Act.328
As drafted, the so-called “Patriot II” would have removed existing protections
under the Freedom of Information Act, making it easier for the government to hide whom
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it is holding and why, and preventing the public from ever being able to assess whether
the government has overreached. Another section would have nullified existing consent
decrees against state law-enforcement agencies which prevent them from spying on
individuals and organizations.329
Perhaps the most troubling provision in the proposed new law would have
stripped U.S. citizenship from anyone who gave “material support” to any group that the
attorney general designates as a terrorist organization.330 Under the Constitution,
Americans cannot be involuntarily deprived of citizenship. The new measure would have
allowed the government to overcome that guarantee by arguing that anyone who provides
“material support” to an organization on the attorney general’s blacklist – even if that
support were otherwise lawful – intends to relinquish citizenship and therefore may be
immediately expatriated.331
The proposed new legislation was widely criticized by both liberals and
conservatives.332 The American Civil Liberties Union declared that the government “has
resorted to detentions, deportations and other tactics reminiscent of the Palmer Raids that
led to our founding 83 years ago.” The ACLU claims that the Justice Department is
aggressively wielding its new power to force banks, Internet service providers, telephone
companies, and credit agencies to turn over their customers’ records – without having to
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disclose the investigation to the customers, and without having to prove to a judge that
there is probable cause a crime has been committed.333
III.

ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS

Determining the proper extent to which civil liberties can be curtailed during
times of terror, before history plays itself out, is a daunting but necessary task. Hindsight,
of course, is almost always superior to foresight.

Nevertheless, although the best

speculation may be little more than educated guesswork, history should be instructive.
Fear of the unknown will always be a factor in fighting an intractable enemy –
particularly one which treats suicide as martyrdom – but in the perilous quest to preserve
civil liberties in uncivil times, we must be ever vigilant not to tread on hard-won
individual rights without a reasonable degree of certainty that preventive and
investigative measures are temporary and necessary.

The Patriot Act and its Progeny
Sixteen of the provisions of the Patriot Act of 2001 were originally set to expire at
the end of 2005,334 virtually assuring that renewal of the Act would be hotly debated in
Congress. Indeed the sunset provisions brought directly into play the concerns of a wide
variety of groups and individuals.335 Nearly 400 communities and the legislatures of
seven states expressed similar misgivings.336
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Some of these concerns were addressed in the reauthorization of the Patriot Act,
which passed Congress in early March of 2006. The most important amendments were
produced by a bipartisan cross-section of Congress:337
* The renewed Act now guarantees that those receiving a subpoena gag order
(also known as a National Security Letter) can challenge that order in court
through judicial review.338
* The former requirement that an individual served with a secret subpoena
must reveal to the FBI the name of his attorney has been removed. 339
* Libraries operating in their traditional role are not subject to secret
subpoenas.340
The changes, however, do not require that there be any individualized suspicion
of wrongdoing by Americans before their financial, medical, library, and bookstore
records can be searched.”341
In particular, the government’s demand for records still contains an automatic and
potentially permanent gag order, which is virtually impossible to challenge in view of
the bill’s requirement that a court accept the government’s “national security”
certification supporting a gag order as “conclusive.”

From the perspective of civil

libertarians, this provision actually makes the former Patriot Act more restrictive. While
a gag order is no longer indefinite, it will last for an initial one-year period that can be
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renewed indefinitely at the government’s discretion. Worse still, unlike the old law,
which did not make government certifications conclusive, the new law binds courts to
accept such certifications. Federal courts had, in fact, rejected certifications where they
failed to provide sufficient facts to meet the compelling interest standard demanded by
the First Amendment for a prior restraint on speech.342
In addition, secret searches of homes and offices will remain available in any
federal case under a vague standard, and notice can be delayed for months. There is still
no requirement that roving wiretaps name a target or a facility being monitored, and
government agents need not verify that a suspect is actually using the facility before
eavesdropping on private conversations.343
The reauthorized Patriot Act expands the Secret Service’s power to impose
“exclusion zones” to apply to non-Presidential events, and it increases fines and criminal
penalties that the Treasury Department has used in the past to coerce non-profit
organizations and businesses into checking employees against flawed government lists.344

Privacy Issues
It is of no small concern that Fourth-Amendment rights continue to be jeopardized
by the USA Patriot Act.

For example, government agents are empowered to enter a

home or office when the occupant is away, take photographs and remove property, and
have no obligation to inform the occupant until afterwards. There have been challenges
to the so-called “sneak-and-peek” warrants which permit delayed notice of a search,
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where (the government argues) the warrant may have an “adverse result” on an
investigation.345
In November of 2002, the Bush administration won approval for wider use of
surveillance against terror and espionage suspects when a federal appeals court declared
that such surveillance does not violate the Constitution. The ruling by a three-judge
panel, sitting as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review appointed by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled that the standard of evidence required to open a wiretap for
national security purposes is generally much lower than that needed for domestic criminal
cases.346
The court emphasized, however, that it was not ready “to jettison Fourth
Amendment requirements in the interest of national security,” but that it also recognized
the validity and importance of FISA.347
For over two decades, the FISA court had seldom turned down a government
request for a wiretap. Nevertheless, the court said that the Attorney General had gone too
far in his zeal for wiretaps, citing some 75 cases in which the Justice Department tried to
circumvent rules designed to protect Americans from surveillance.348
The President through his Attorney General continues to argue that
circumventing FISA is necessary to monitor al Qaeda operatives in the United States. He

345

See ACLU, HOW THE USA PATRIOT ACT EXPANDS LAW ENFORCEMENT "SNEAK AND PEEK"
WARRANTS (Oct. 23, 2001), available at: http://www.aclu.org/congress/L102301b.html. See also United
States v. Hogan, 122 F.Supp.2d 358 (E.D.N.Y.,2000); United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337-38
(2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 991 (1990); United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir.1986),
after remand, 856 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Johns, 948 F.2d 399 (9th Cir.1991); and
United States v. Ludwig, 902 F. Supp. 121 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
346

David Stout, Appeals Panel Reverses Limits Placed on Justice Dept. Wiretaps, November 18, 2002.

347

In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, Nos. 02-001, 02-002, (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. Nov 18, 2002).

348

This American Life: Secret Government, National Public
93 Radio, Jan. 10, 2003.

93

did not explain, however, how such a policy can be justified under the separation-ofpowers principles embodied in the Constitution.349
Civil libertarians fear that the government has already been using the new antiterror measures to conduct espionage wiretaps in ordinary criminal investigations. The
Fourth Amendment still exists, and citizens continue to be entitled to protection against
unreasonable searches. When police watch a suspect with high-powered, inter-connected
and intelligent cameras that are linked to criminal-history databases, they are in effect
conducting unwarranted and possible unconstitutional searches.

This practice is

especially nefarious when put to political uses, as they have been in Washington, D.C.350
Moreover, there is no certain proof that surveillance cameras are effective. In fact
crime actually increased in Great Britain despite the installation of up to two million
cameras in streets, shops, banks, and other public areas.351
The courts have ruled that warrantless monitoring of attorney-client conversations
with prisoners who had been placed under special administrative measures does not
violate the Fourth Amendment because there can be no expectation of privacy in
prison.352 However, the question of whether the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the
right to counsel presumes confidentiality has yet to be fully addressed.
Supporters of the Patriot Act argue that some of the 9/11 hijackers used library
Internet terminals to communicate. The “apocalyptic visions of the demise of American
civil liberties,” they say, “are widely overblown.” Nevertheless, many communities
349
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around the country have passed local measures opposing the Patriot Act.353 The power
granted by the Patriot Act to the FBI to pursue library records and computer hard drives
(in order to determine what books patrons have checked out, the web pages they have
visited, and where they have sent e-mails) is ripe for abuse.354

Immigration Policies and Pre-Trial Detentions
Following the events of September 11, 2001, concerns for national security
measures understandably provoked a re-examination of immigration laws, focusing not
only on who should be allowed into the country but under what conditions they are
allowed to remain.
For some time, there have been widespread misgivings about the effectiveness of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in carrying out its functions under
existing laws. According to the latest INS statistics, over 30 million visas were granted
to foreign nationals in 1998, mostly to enter the United States for purposes of study,
teaching, travel, or business. By some analyses, as many as forty percent of those
granted visas have overstayed them, and as many as ninety percent of non-detained
individuals who received final deportation orders failed to surrender to the INS. For
these failures, the agency has been widely and roundly criticized.355
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Although responsibility for the bombing in 1995 bombing of the federal building
in Oklahoma City that left 168 people dead was eventually traced to an American
dissident, at first it was feared that the incident had been perpetrated by a Middle Eastern
terrorist group.356

In response Congress passed the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) – designed to protect the country from foreign terrorism.
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Immigration and Nationality Act was
modified by the USA Patriot Act, which allowed the Attorney General to take into
custody any alien certified to be inadmissible or deportable on one of six grounds: (1)
espionage; (2) sabotage; (3) export restrictions; (4) attempt to overthrow the United
States Government; (5) terrorist activities; and (6) any other “activity that endangers the
national security of the United States.” The government is then required to begin either
criminal or deportation proceedings within seven days of the detention. However, certain
certified alien terrorists who are not likely to be deported in the foreseeable future due to
the continuing nature of the investigation, are subject to indefinite detainment.357
A 2001 Supreme Court decision, Zadvydas v. Davis, arguably exempted
suspected alien terrorists as a “small segment of particularly dangerous individuals” that
the government could subject to indefinite detention.358 The new law seems to satisfy the
Court’s jurisprudential criteria, in that it specifically provides (a) for judicial review of
suspected alien terrorists’ detentions via habeas corpus; (b) for fixed time limits for
review of the Attorney General’s initial certification; and (c) that an alien whose
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“removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, may be detained for additional
periods of up to six months if release threatens national security or the safety of an
individual or the community.” Furthermore, the Attorney General is required to review
certification every six months; the suspected alien terrorist can request a reconsideration
of the certification every six months.359
The Patriot Act makes aliens subject to deportation for virtually any activity in
association with a “terrorist organization.” Because the Act defines “terrorist activity” to
include virtually any use or threat to use a weapon against a person or property, and
defines a “terrorist organization” as any group of two or more persons that engages in
such an act, virtually every dissident organization is encompassed – including a pro-life
organization that once threatened workers at an abortion clinic, the African National
Congress, the Irish Republican Army, and the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Once a
group has been designated as “terrorist,” aliens are deemed deportable for everything
from recruitment to fund-raising to providing any kind of material support, including
payment of dues. Conceivably, the law would extend to those who might support or join
counter-terrorism groups.360
Congress may want to make further changes to tighten the existing law, including
more thorough screening and background checks of individuals seeking visas to enter the
United States and tracking the millions of illegal aliens who have overstayed their
visas.361

359

8 U.S.C. §1226b.

360

David Cole, Terrorizing Immigrants in the Name of Fighting Terrorism, 29 WTR HUM.RTS. (2002) 11-

12.
361

Eric Schmitt, Agency Finds Itself Under Siege, With Many Responsibilities and Critics, USA TODAY,
Mar. 15, 2002, A11.
97

97

The degree to which such legislation encourages racial profiling or an atmosphere
of bigotry and fear in the general population is difficult to predict.362 Laws that have a
negative impact on the majority of law-abiding aliens – especially those made guilty
merely by their association with an ethnic or racial class – are anathema to fundamental
American principles of fairness and justice. The Supreme Court has ruled that guilt by
association violates the First and Fifth Amendments.363 Everyone, including aliens, has a
First-Amendment right to associate with groups regardless of their goals, so long as they
are not illegal. Likewise, under Fifth-Amendment jurisprudence, guilt is personal.364
The Patriot Act also allows the government to deny entry into the country purely
on the basis of what an applicant may have said, particularly if the words could be
construed as endorsing terrorist activity. But in the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1990, after years of politically-motivated denials of visas that proved embarrassing,
Congress explicitly repealed such grounds for exclusion.365
Prior to 9/11, aliens could be detained only so long as the government had reason
to believe that they posed a threat to national security, but they could be released upon
order of an immigration judge. The new regulations gave the INS greater detention
powers: Now, even if a judge rules in favor of the alien, INS prosecutors can keep him
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locked up simply by filing an appeal of the release order, without any showing that the
appeal – which routinely takes many months – is likely to succeed.366
Moreover, the Patriot Act gives the attorney general himself the power to detain
aliens – defining a suspected terrorist so broadly that it includes even those who may
have provided humanitarian aid to an organization disfavored by the government.
Detentions may be based merely on “reasonable grounds to believe” that an alien has
engaged in terrorist activity, a standard that the INS has likened to the “reasonable
suspicion” required for a brief stop-and-frisk under the Fourth Amendment. Reasonable
suspicion, however, does not always justify a custodial arrest, much less indefinite
detention.
The Act also permits detention for up to seven days without filing any charges.
Yet the Supreme Court has ruled in a criminal setting that charges must be filed within
forty-eight hours except in the most extraordinary circumstances.

Hundreds of

immigrants not charged with any crime, much less involvement in the 9/11 attack, have
been detained in secret, even where judges rule that there is no basis for detention, and
without going before a judge at all.367
After 9/11, the INS increased the scrutiny of refugees to the United States and
their relatives. According to the new rules, before boarding a plane for the U.S., refugees
must meet with a representative of the International Organization for Migration (funded
by the State Department), who will compare them with photographs in their application
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documents. Refugees are fingerprinted at major ports of entry in the United States before
they are allowed to go to their final destinations.368
For immigrants already on U.S. soil, the federal government launched sweeps of
workplace where significant numbers of undocumented immigrants were thought to be
working. Critics of such actions have argued that U.S. employers knowingly and actively
recruited into their firms many of the undocumented immigrants, and suggest that the
government should be targeting employers rather than the undocumented workers.
Several industries – such as commercial aviation, meat-packing, agribusiness,
construction, and hospitality services – could collapse if undocumented immigrants were
summarily deported. Moreover, many immigrants who are the targets of these
enforcement actions have children who are U.S. citizens.369
Both the AEDPA and the USA Patriot Act present new challenges with regard to
protecting the civil liberties of Arabs and Arab-Americans – both of which groups have
been denied the protection afforded to normal criminal defendants.370
In short, if maintaining traditional American civil liberties is itself central to
preserving national security, our immigration policies need substantial shoring.
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Deportations
Following the events of 9/11, the Attorney General, wielding power bestowed
upon him by Congress, gave immigration judges the authority to close to the public
certain “special interest” deportation hearings in the interest of national security. About
750 such cases were active at the time. The Chief Immigration Judge issued a directive
consistent with that of the Attorney General, requiring the judges in his jurisdiction
presiding over special-interest deportation cases to close all proceedings to the public,
press, family, and friends of the deportee. Only the deportee’s attorney could view the
record.371
In December of 2001, the government began removal proceedings against Rabih
Haddad, suspected of funding terrorist organizations through an Islamic charity he
operated in Detroit, as an alien subject to deportation for overstaying his tourist visa.
Without prior notice to Haddad or his attorney, his bail hearing was closed to the public.
Bail was denied and he was taken into custody, where he remains.372
Various suits were filed claiming that the directive violated the First-Amendment
right of access to deportation hearings.373 At virtually the same time, media plaintiffs in
Newark sought access to and information about deportation hearings held in the Newark
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Immigration Court which, pursuant to the same directive, had been denied because they
involved “special-interest” cases.374
Both the deportation hearings and media organizations in each case were in
separate federal jurisdictions. The appellate court in each circuit reached diametrically
opposite decisions.
In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, the district court had granted the media
plaintiffs’ motion. In August of 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
finding that the directive violated the public’s right of access to deportation hearings
conferred by the First Amendment, and that any closing of deportation hearings must be
done on a case-by- case basis.375
In North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, the district court recognized a
presumption of openness for deportation hearings, holding that the directive was not so
narrowly tailored that it curtailed the public’s right of access in the least restrictive
manner. Consequently, said the court, the government failed to overcome the strictscrutiny standard, and operation of the directive was enjoined. Less than two months
after the Detroit Free Press decision, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,
thereby reinstating the directive that required the hearings be closed.376
The split in the circuits meant that the Supreme Court, which once ruled that all
criminal trials must presumptively be open, would have to decide the issue.377 However,
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in May of 2003, the Court declined to review the decisions, thus leaving intact, at least
for the time being, the split in the circuits.378
Profiling
Even in the face of official condemnation, racial profiling of South Asians and
people of Middle-Eastern extraction by police and public security personnel appears to be
distinctly on the increase.
To many observers, it simply makes sense to focus law-enforcement energies on
Arab and Middle Eastern men: like it or not, the argument goes, they are the people who
constitute the real threat, and no amount of political correctness will change that.
Terrorist attacks of such enormous proportions as those which occurred on 9/11, followed
by a declaration of war, makes racial profiling a temporary necessity that no patriotic
American should protest. It has become necessary to get information from people likely
to know the Arab, Muslim, and Middle Eastern suspects.

It is hard to avoid the

assumption that this kind of information will not come from the population at large, but
from the Middle Eastern communities themselves.379
On the other hand, profiling can amount to a coded racial appeal of the type that
has had negative reverberations throughout U.S. history. Although the assumption of
guilt on the basis of racial identity is not new, it is contrary to American principles of
fairness and justice, an inadequate means by which to preserve constitutional values in a
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period of distress. The government’s implicit justification for racial profiling also serves
to encourage hate crimes.380
Another argument against profiling is that it fails to fathom the nature of the
enemy in the current war against terrorism. Al Qaeda has shown itself to be intelligent,
resourceful, patient, and adaptable.

Fighting terrorists effectively may well require

ensuring good relations with the Arab and Muslim communities in the United States.381
As is often the case in times of national crisis, non-citizen immigrants were the
hardest hit by the Bush Administration’s anti-terrorist regulations. Following 9/11, the
government secretly rounded up and detained somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000
people, mostly foreigners. Not one of them was charged with involvement in the 9/11
attacks; except for four people indicted in August 2002 for supporting terrorism, no one
has been charged with a terrorist act. The vast majority were arrested on various
immigration charges and then effectively disappeared. Their cases were not listed on any
public docket, their hearings were closed, and the presiding judges were instructed to
neither confirm nor deny that the cases exist.382
The policies promulgated by the government would deprive all Americans of their
due-process rights, not just immigrants. A case in point is that of Jose Padilla, a U.S.
citizen arrested on American soil on suspicion of plotting to plant a bomb. He has been
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held indefinitely in a Navy prison, and denied access to counsel.383 According to the
White House, Padilla will stay confined to a brig in South Carolina “until the end of the
war.”384
The government alleges that Padilla was an “enemy combatant” who plotted to
assemble a “dirty bomb” that would spread radioactive contamination over a wide area.
It cited three cases in support of its argument that enemy combatants can be detained for
purposes of intelligence-gathering and ensuring they are unable to further assist the
enemy:

Ex Parte Quirin (where the Supreme Court held that eight Nazi soldiers,

captured on U.S. soil in 1942, none of them U.S. citizens, could be tried in military
tribunals); In Re Territo (in which the Court upheld denial of habeas corpus in 1946 to a
U.S. citizen who had been raised in Italy, joined the Italian army, and captured in 1943,
was held as prisoner of war and transferred to camp in California); and Colepaugh v.
Loone (in which the Court refused to overturn the death sentence of an American citizen
who had become a Nazi spy, who had slipped ashore in Maine in 1944, and who had
been tried in secret military tribunals and sentenced to hang).385
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In June of 2002 Padilla filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Southern District
of New York, arguing his detention violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.386
In November of 2005, Padilla finally won the right for his case to be heard, when the
government announced that he would be charged with “providing – and conspiring to
provide – material support to terrorists, and conspiring to murder individuals who are
overseas.”387
A case similar to Padilla’s is that of Yaser Hamdi, who was born in America to
Saudi parents, and who was captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan. Like Padilla,
Hamdi is being held in a Navy brig, uncharged and without access to counsel. When a
habeas corpus petition was filed on his behalf, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that his detention was legal and he was not authorized to challenge his
designation as an enemy combatant.388 That decision has been roundly criticized.389
In reviewing that decision, the Supreme Court found that although Congress was
authorized to detain “enemy combatants,” due process requires that such a person be
given a meaningful opportunity to consent to the factual basis for the detention, before a
neutral magistrate.390 Three years after his initial capture, it was announced that Hamdi
386
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would be allowed to return to Saudi Arabia where he would have to renounce any claim
of American citizenship, and to accept travel restrictions as it was determined he was not
a major threat.391
Even liberals defend detentions in some cases. Professor Tribe, for example, feels
it would be “suicidal” to release captured soldiers who belong to an enemy force
committed to the murder of American civilians, whether it is the army of a nation-state or
of a trans-national group like al Qaeda. Military detention may indeed be constitutional
“if review by a federal court confirms the executive’s assertions that people detained are
in fact enemy combatants.”392
Similarly, some lawyers think that the Bush administration is well within its
authority to order detention of unlawful combatants until the conclusion of the armed
conflict, and then to try them before either a military tribunal or civilian court.393
But liberals and conservatives agree that the detention policy can go way beyond
what is necessary in order to achieve national security. Prof. Tribe also feels that the
government has gone too far:
When it comes to the fundamental right to talk to a lawyer, to talk to a
judge, not to have the government unilaterally by its own say-so draw the
boundary between the preventive wartime model and the reactive judicial
model, there’s really no difference between citizens and non-citizens.
This is not like any other war. It’s not like the Civil War, the
Revolutionary War, World War I or II. This one by definition can go on
forever like the war on cancer or the war on drugs. Because that’s right,
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we have to be unusually careful about checks and balances and about
openness and accountability.394
Indeed it appears that the government has made more than one mistake in its
sweep of men of Middle-East descent following the 9/11 bombings. For example, Hady
Hassan Omar was arrested in September of 2001, taken from his wife and child, and held
in solitary confinement in a maximum-security penitentiary in Louisiana under the new
anti-terror measures. He was not allowed to see an attorney. He was in captivity for 73
days. After he was released, he filed suit in a federal court, arguing that the government
exceeded its constitutional powers and deprived him of his civil rights.395
In all, close to 1,150 young Muslim men were rounded up in the aftermath of
9/11. More than 400 people have been deported following lengthy internment periods
and closed hearings. Only three of those arrests resulted in terrorism-related
indictments.396
Terrorism is not like traditional crime, which calls for apprehension of the
perpetrator, trial, and conviction. The nature of the terrorist threat requires that a strong
effort be made to prevent it before it occurs, and that goal calls for a greater use of
extraordinary investigative and prosecutorial techniques. What it also calls for, however,
is greater accountability.397
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Secret Military Tribunals
A rhetorical theme of the Bush Administration that has resonated well with the
public is that the United States will “bring justice to the terrorists and them to justice.”398
In the military campaign in Afghanistan, approximately five hundred al Qaeda
and Taliban fighters were captured and turned over to U.S. forces for disposition; about
three hundred of them were transported to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for temporary
internment.399

Among the detainees were citizens of some twenty-five countries,

including Britain, Australia, France, Belgium, Sweden, Algeria, Yemen, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.400
Two questions immediately arose concerning due process. First, were these
individuals entitled to treatment as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions?401
Second, if criminal trials were to be pursued by the United States, should the accused be
tried in a federal district court or by a military tribunal?
The Third Geneva Convention covers the treatment of prisoners of war and
procedures for criminal proceedings against them, including the definition of who
constitutes a bona fide POW.402 After some internal debate, the Bush Administration
affirmed that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 did apply to the conflict in Afghanistan
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and, hence, to the Taliban government. However, since al Qaeda is a terrorist
organization, under the law of war its members are not considered as part of an armed
force. They did not carry arms openly, bear a fixed distinctive sign visible at a distance,
and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war – all
requirements under international law.403
Moreover, they used civilians as both the means and targets of their attacks.
Having engaged in acts of war both in the September 11th attacks and in fighting
alongside the Taliban in an internationally-recognized armed conflict in Afghanistan,
they can be deemed responsible for breach of the law of war, but are not entitled to the
status of prisoners of war. The United States argued further that the Taliban fighters had
likewise forfeited any special status because they had “adopted and provided support to
the unlawful terrorist objectives of the al Qaeda.”404
Thus it was determined that neither the terrorists who planned and executed the
9/11 attacks nor the Taliban who gave them harbor are entitled to receive POW benefits.
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Nevertheless, the Bush Administration has declared that all detainees would be treated in
accordance with humanitarian principles set out in the Geneva Conventions.405
POWS are liable to prosecution by the forces holding them for violations of the
laws and customs of war or grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Even a citizen of
a “party to a conflict” who is captured by his own sovereign government – such as John
Philip Walker Lindh, an American-born Taliban fighter captured while engaged in
combat against U.S. forces406 – can be prosecuted by his own government for treason,
murder, and other crimes. But a POW may only be tried according to the rules laid out in
the Third Geneva Convention, which provide for basic due process: “A prisoner of war
can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same courts
according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the
Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions of the present Chapter have been
observed.”407
The use of military commissions to try enemies of the United States for war
crimes and related violations of international law, such as crimes against humanity,
committed abroad (or in the case of the Civil War, was not fully under the control of the
U.S. government), has a long history. It is also legal under international law: all nations
have jurisdiction to punish war criminals, and the Geneva Convention requires each
signatory to search them out and bring them to justice in its own courts. In theory at
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least, the United States shares with other countries jurisdiction over war criminals, and it
could exercise that jurisdiction through civilian federal district courts.408
Congress, however, has authorized these courts to try war crimes only when either
the perpetrator or the victim is a U.S. national.409

For some cases, military forums are

the only workable option; in an international armed conflict, commanders in the field
have the authority to convene them.410
The rules governing the operation of the tribunals that the Pentagon released in
March of 2002 closely matched the recommendations of the American Bar Association a
month earlier.411

The ABA had urged that military tribunals be used in limited

circumstances and in accordance with fair trial standards. It adopted a resolution that
these special commissions not be used to try alleged violations of the laws of war by U.S.
citizens, lawful resident aliens, or other aliens who were in the United States legally. The
ABA also called upon the Department of Defense to require that military tribunals
observe the fair trial standards contained in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Finally, the resolutions urged the
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president and Congress to consider the impact of military tribunals on possible
prosecutions of U.S. citizens in other nations.412
Are military tribunals necessary under existing law?
The U.S. government has effectively applied its experience combatting organized
crime (using civilian courts) to fighting terrorism.413 In addition, federal district courts
have the legal authority under both domestic and international law to prosecute
nonresident aliens for terrorist crimes committed on foreign soil, as well as for war
crimes.414
A widely cited precedent is United States v. Yunis,415 which involved the criminal
trial of an Arab terrorist who participated in the hijacking of a Royal Jordanian Airlines
airplane at Beirut International Airport in June 1985. The only connection the hijacking
had with the United States was the fact the plane carried some American citizens. After
reviewing the pertinent international agreements relating to hostage-taking and hijacking,
the federal district court denied a defense motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and
Yunis was convicted of conspiracy, hostage taking, and air piracy.416 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted that jurisdiction is not precluded by norms of
customary international law.417

412

James Podgers, ABA Tackles Tribunals Issue, 1 No. 5 A.B.A. J. E-Report 1, Feb. 8, 2002; Molly
McDonough, An Uncertain Risk: Late Resolutions on Military Tribunals May Still Be in the Works, 1No. 3
A.B.A. J. E-Report 9, Jan. 25, 2002.
413

Two high-profile examples of those recently prosecuted in U.S. criminal courts: Sheik Omar Rahman,
convicted for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; and Wadih el-Hage, convicted for bombing the
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. See James Orenstein, Editorial, Rooting Out Terrorists Just
Became Harder, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at A29.

414

American Bar Association Task Force on Terrorism and the Law, Report and Recommendations on
Military Commissions, at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/military.pdf (last modified Jan. 4, 2002).

415

681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988).

416

Id. Ihsan A. Hijazi, Beirut Highjackers Free Travelers, Blow Up Jet, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1985, at A8.

417

113
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1089-90 (1991).
113

In short, U.S. district courts have jurisdiction to try individuals for terrorist-related
offenses under a variety of statutes, and in at least one case involving a foreign national
who tried to commit an in-flight bombing of an American Airlines flight from Paris to
Miami in December 2001 that power is being exercised. Instead of charging suspected al
Qaeda war criminals with violations of the law of war, the federal courts apply parallel
statutes related to the malum en se crime, or apply the appropriate “terrorist statute.”418
Some observers have noted, however, that trials of suspected terrorists in an
ordinary district court also carry moral and practical down-sides, not the least of which is
that they tend to underscore the weakness of American policy over the past decade in
dealing with terrorism against U.S. targets.419 Also, both the CIA and the FBI have
concentrated on solving past cases, rather than taking action to prevent future terrorist
attacks.420
*
The question of where best to try enemy combatants was brought to a head in
November of 2001, when President Bush signed an executive order that authorized the
creation of military tribunals for the purpose of prosecuting certain “non-citizens” who
may have engaged in terrorist acts against the United States, or who aided/abetted
terrorists.421 In so doing the President re-asserted that those detained at Guantanamo Bay
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were unlawful belligerents not entitled to prisoner-of-war status, suspended the attorneyclient privilege, and ordered that over a thousand people be detained without publicly
identifying them.422
Although the Constitution requires that Congress authorize and regulate military
tribunals,423 the President assumed that power in an Executive Order dated November 13,
2001. 424
A military tribunal consists of a panel of officers who are authorized to render a
verdict and sentence.

Historically, the question has been whether tribunals are

constitutionally capable of prosecuting non-citizen belligerents for offenses in violation
of the law of war (and not whether they can be used to prosecute citizens). As noted
earlier, the Supreme Court rendered its opinion on the issue in the post-American Civil
War case of Ex Parte Milligan425 – holding that as long as the civilian courts were
operating, the use of military tribunals to try citizens who were not actual belligerents
was unconstitutional. The standard for the use of military tribunals to prosecute noncitizen belligerents for offenses in violation of the law of war is set out in the World War
II era case of Ex Parte Quirin.426
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422
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Although it is well established that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply both to
citizens and non-citizens alike, such protections do not extend to individuals subjected to
trial in military tribunals for war crimes.427 In Application of Yamashita, the Supreme
Court traced the history of military tribunals and concluded that by recognizing them “in
order to preserve their traditional jurisdiction over enemy combatants . . . Congress gave
sanction, as we held in Ex Parte, to any use of military commissions contemplated by the
common law of war.”428 Under customary and treaty-based international law, military
tribunals are appropriate forums for trying war criminals and unlawful combatants,429
although they do not necessarily provide all of the Geneva Convention rights afforded to
prisoners of war.430
President Bush’s order providing for the trial before military commissions of
aliens suspected of involvement in terrorist activities or membership in al Qaeda431 has
been controversial – perhaps proving once again that, especially on the question of how
best to balance individual rights with national security, reasonable people can differ.
Members of the President’s own party had sharply differing views. Sen. Orrin
Hatch (R. Utah), the senior Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, supported
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Bush, but Rep. Robert Barr (R. Ga.), a member of the House Judiciary Committee,
decried the Administration’s lack of respect for civil liberties.432 Tim Lynch, director of
the Cato Institute’s project on criminal justice, accused Bush of “arrogance” and his
administration of trying to take presidential power “farther than it has gone before.”433
Even the conservative Heritage Foundation warned the administration to proceed with
caution.434
Both liberals and conservatives have criticized the military order as a deprivation
of basic constitutional rights, such as that to be tried before an independent court and
jury, an appeal to independent judges, and full access to the evidence used to support a
conviction. Now a detainee can be tried, convicted, and ultimately executed without any
independent judicial review, and without anyone outside the military – including the
defendant – ever seeing the evidence upon which the conviction rests.
As the liberal group Common Cause pointed out in calling upon the
President to reconsider, in our efforts to hunt down and bring to justice war
criminals who have killed thousands of Americans, we have to make sure that
justice itself does not become a casualty. “The policies your executive order
would permit – namely secret trials with unappealable verdicts – seem eerily
reminiscent of the kind of trials we have rightly criticized in other countries.”435
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Even some prominent conservatives joined the liberal media in denouncing the
Administration’s plan to try terrorists before secret military tribunals.436 “It is a good
sign for American democracy that voices are being raised against President Bush’s
attempt to scuttle due process by sending foreign terrorist suspects to military tribunals,”
editorialized the Boston Globe.437 “Why in the world do they need to use military
tribunals?” asked the Greensboro (North Carolina) News and Record, noting that
Timothy McVeigh, the domestic terrorist who blew up a federal building in Oklahoma
City, had been tried in a regular court of law.438 An op-ed in the Milwaukee JournalSentinel said, “Rarely, but inevitably, there comes a time when the American people must
tell a president ‘enough.’ That time is now.”439
Spokesmen for the Bush Administration, meanwhile, have not been coy in
defending the decision to use secret military tribunals in the legal war on terrorism. Vice
President Richard Cheney argued that terrorists did not deserve the guarantees and
safeguards afforded to defendants by the civilian judicial system. Attorney General
Ashcroft said similarly that “foreign terrorists who commit war crimes against the United
States” are not entitled to the protections of the American Constitution.”440
Other proponents of military tribunals argue that they would bring such criminals
to justice quickly, that the President’s order would prevent reprisals against jurors by
supporters of terrorist defendants, and that – because the proceedings could be held in
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secret – the government could avoid disclosing classified information and the methods
used to obtain it. “An open trial…covered by television, would be an ideal stage for
Osama bin Laden to spread his propaganda to all the Muslims in the World.”441
Moreover, despite criticism in the media, the President’s order appeared to enjoy
overwhelming public support. A Newsweek poll found that 67 percent of Americans
approved the plan, although ideas about how it should operate sometimes differed
substantially.442
The Bush Administration moved to placate opponents by promising additional
regulations outlining the actual procedures for the military commissions, to be drafted by
the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, which would provide for greater
procedural protection than the original order requires.443 At the same time, however, the
Administration challenged critics on grounds of national security and war-time exigency.
In hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Ashcroft bluntly told lawmakers that
their “power of oversight is not without limit,” and that in some areas “I cannot and will
not consult with you.”444
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Nevertheless, when the government prosecuted the first alien accused of terrorist
activities after the order was issued, it brought the case in a civilian court, rather than
before a military commission.445
Various law professors also argue in favor of having suspects tried by
international tribunals. Paul Williams and Michael Scharf, for example, write that the
U.S. has been able to prosecute only a handful of “low-level culprits and ideological
supporters.” With potentially thousands of al Qaeda terrorists who could conceivably fall
into the hands of the U.S. military, they claim that this process will neither serve as
adequate justice nor as an effective deterrent to further acts of terror. Moreover, domestic
prosecution prevents the early apprehension of terrorists: this is what happened when the
Clinton Administration declined Sudan’s offer in 1996 to turn over Osama bin Laden
because there was not sufficient probable cause to try him in U.S. courts.446
Unlike in European tribunals, hearsay statements cannot be introduced in an
American court.447 Moreover, there are limitations on what an intelligence community
concerned with possible future attacks might be willing to expose in open court.
Although the Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980 promulgates rules on
using secret information in court, trials must remain open. Non-classified information
might also be of great interest to terrorists, such as disclosure that one of their manuals of
procedure had been seized (allowing them to make adjustments). In the 1993 World
445
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Trade Center bombing, extensive engineering data on the construction of the towers was
offered in evidence; while such information is public, it is much easier to obtain when
brought into open court in a trial. In short, the perpetrators of terrorist attacks are not
morally and legally analogous to those who commit domestic crime.448 Even Harvard’s
Lawrence Tribe – not generally known for his conservative views – concedes that
civilian juries in wartime are not inherently likely to be any more fair than military
tribunals.”449
Others feel that the appropriate forum for trying accused terrorists ought to be
some form of international tribunal, convened under the authority of some international
body, rather than simply the national courts of the United States – because the crimes
committed by the terrorists are offenses against the world at large and universal morality.
Moreover, those who try them should be seen to have the impartiality that is presumed to
come with international rather than merely national institutions of justice. Supporters of
this view tend to be academics, journalists, or members of the international nongovernment organization (NGO) community.450
The virtue of international tribunals is not so obvious to European citizens, who
naturally look to their own governments for security and justice. Moreover, governments
do not want the burden of hosting an international tribunal, or perhaps worse, being
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responsible for the imprisonment of convicted terrorists for long periods of time. They
would rather see the United States bear these risks.
Still others argue that, in view of the fact that the 9/11 attacks were directed
against American property and people, allowing the United States to make the decisions
and bear the security risks would be the morally correct thing to do.451
Non-military international tribunals have also been criticized as inappropriate and
ineffective forums for trying terrorists. Such standing tribunals are a relatively new
concept, often formed by the countries on the winning side in an armed conflict. They are
“costly and cumbersome”452 – as witness the international war-crimes tribunal in The
Hague has been under attack for being too slow and expensive. Moreover, because these
proceedings are public, they do not provide for the adequate protection of sensitive
information.453 International tribunals are also problematic because of such issues as the
absence of a death penalty, possible security compromises of sources and techniques, and
reduced levels of due process provided to the accused.454
*
All of the arguments pro and con have thus far been academic. The first suspect
who could have been tried by a military tribunal – Zacarias Moussaoui, a FrenchMorocccan who was arrested in August 2001 as a co-conspirator in the 9/11 attacks –
was instead arraigned in a federal district court in Alexandria, Virginia, where he will
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stand trial.455 None of the nearly 500 al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners being held either in
Afghanistan or at Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba have been found by the
Pentagon to be suitable for the new military tribunals.456

Constitutional Issues
It is inevitable that, once again, the Supreme Court will ultimately be called upon
to assess the nature of the threat – criminal or military, abroad or here at home – and to
decide whether or not the ordinary rules of constitutional law apply.
Former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has already cautioned that “we’re likely to
experience more restrictions on our personal freedom than has ever been the case in our
country.” The limit will come, she suggests, at the point where “the cost to civil liberties
from legislation designed to prevent terrorism outweigh[s] the added security that that

455

Moussaoui was indicted on December 11, 2001 and charged with conspiring with Osama bin Laden and
other members of al Qaeda to murder thousands of Americans. Under the President’s order Maussaoui
could have been tried before a military tribunal because he was a French citizen of Moroccan descent.
Administration officials said the decision to prosecute Moussaoui in federal court followed a contentious
debate between the Pentagon, which wanted to try him in an overseas military tribunal, and the Justice
Department, which has secured convictions in several important terrorist cases in American courts.
According to Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, the Attorney General recommended that the cases be heard in a
civilian criminal court, and the President concurred. David Johnston & Philip Shenon, Man Held Since
August is Accused of Helping in Sept. 11 Terror Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at A-1, col. 2 and B-7.
In the opinion of Elisa Massimino of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights: “The Moussaoui
indictment makes it hard to imagine a case that could justify the use of military courts inside the United
States.” Alien Justice: What’s Wrong with Military Trials of Terrorist Suspects?, 25 HUM. RTS. 14, 14
(2002). See also Brooke A. Masters, Invoking Allah, Terror Suspect Enters No Plea, WASH. POST, Jan. 3,
2002, at A1. In early April of 2003, the federal judge overseeing the trial of Moussaoui said that she was
“disturbed” at the volume of classified material prosecutors were withholding from the accused conspirator,
and suggested that they may be unfairly preventing him from preparing a defense. Richard B. Schmitt,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Another Hitch in Moussaoui Case, April 5, 2002 at p. 14. In April of 2005, Moussaoui
pleaded guilty to conspiring with al Qaeda to hijack planes and commit other crimes. His sentencing trial
began on March 7, 2006.
456
Charles V. Pena, Blowback: The Unintended Consequences of Military Tribunals, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 119 (2002), citing Pauline Jelinek, Pentagon: No Tribunal Candidates, YAHOO!
123
NEWS, Feb. 26, 2002.

123

legislation provides.” That point is never easy to find during the heat of battle. Finding it
in hindsight, however, may mean finding it too late.457
*
President Bush’s Military Order refers to several statutes, but in issuing it he
seems to have relied primarily on the inherent powers of his office, especially his
authority as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.458 The Constitution does not
empower the President to subject anyone he suspects of terrorist activity to a military trial
(as the Supreme Court ruled in Ex Parte Milligan).459 On the other hand, the Court has
endorsed the use of such tribunals to try foreign military personnel in places where there
has been actual combat.460
Imperfect as the Military Order may be, the fundamental concept of using military
commissions can well be justified morally, politically, and legally. They can be shaped
to accommodate the Constitution, international law, and the Geneva Conventions. It is
not unreasonable to expect them (as opposed to international tribunals or even ordinary
U.S. district courts) to be the vehicle for the prosecution of at least the most serious
categories of alleged terrorists (those who by their conduct and ideology have made
themselves not merely criminals, but enemies). Considering the sheer number of possible
defendants, and the fact that the United States gained custody of them in the context of
457
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armed conflict against a terrorist network and its state sponsors, the military tribunal
model is arguably appropriate.
But the Military Order could as well be much too sweeping in it scope. By
proclaiming that the proposed tribunals “shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to
offenses” committed by the individuals to whom the order applies, and that those charged
“shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or
indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual’s behalf, in
. . . any court of the United States,461 the President sought to insulate his military tribunals
from all oversight by the civilian federal judiciary.462
Permanent residents of the United States, like citizens, should be accorded full
constitutional protection. The Military Order, however, fails to treat alien permanent
residency as a separate and protected category of non-citizen. Federal courts must still
deal with the clear language of the Sixth Amendment: “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.” That
language applies as well to permanent residents. As Professor Tribe has stated, “[N]ot
even Congress could empower a president to subject any resident alien to trial by tribunal
whenever the president claims reason to believe that the accused ever aided or abetted
what the president deems international terrorism.”463
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged that the new measures are
extra-ordinary. “Our normal procedure is that if somebody does something unlawful . . .
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the first thing we want to do is apprehend them, then try them in a court and then punish
them.” In the case of people like Jose Padilla, however, Rumsfeld says that is not our
first priority:
We are not interested in trying him at the moment; we are
not interested in punishing him at the moment. We are
interested in finding out what he knows. Here is a person
who unambiguously was interested in radiation weapons
and terrorist activity, and was in league with al Quaeda.
Now our job, as responsible government officials, is to do
everything possible to find out what that person knows, and
see if we can’t help our country or other countries.464
While on the surface the use of military tribunals to try terrorists apprehended
outside the United States for war crimes committed in other countries makes a good deal
of sense, it is certainly not an unavoidable necessity. General courts-martial appear to
have the authority to hear all such cases, and Congress has given the civilian federal
courts jurisdiction in a large percentage of those that might arise.

That does not leave us

with clear guidelines. Professor Fletcher’s argument hits home: we are in a state of
collective confusion. “Our conceptual waffling has become dangerous, for at the same
time that we cannot articulate what we are doing, we believe strongly that we must be
doing the right thing. . . .We cannot agree on what we are doing, other than to affirm that
it is the right thing to do!”465
A healthy democracy, however, depends on openness. The possibility that
military commissions established to try alien members of al Qaeda might be misused to
hide from American citizens information that they need to monitor and control their own
government is reason enough to be skeptical about the Bush Administration’s plans.
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Even if military tribunals are legal, using them to fight terrorism on the home front would
be as unwise as it is unnecessary.
Perhaps the Secretary of Defense is right: the war on terrorism is so important that
we need to lock people up, without charges, for the duration of the war, just to find out
what they know. Perhaps it’s true that the new battlefields are not just in Afghanistan or
Iraq or Israel, but extend everywhere, even onto our own soil. Perhaps it’s true that,
although in every other war American courts have permitted some kind of trial for enemy
combatants, this war is different. Perhaps it’s true that we have to trust the government
when it says the secret evidence against these defendants, even though they are
Americans, cannot be revealed in a court of law for legitimate security purposes.
Perhaps the time has come for us to re-think our basic constitutional rights.
But if so, it’s not to be done lightly, and certainly not off the record.466

CONCLUSIONS
Government officials have responded to terrorist attacks by proposing and
enacting “anti-terrorism” legislation. Policy-makers believe that curtailing privacy and
certain civil liberties can help prevent terrorism.467
The reason that academics have been slow to weigh in on the issue is much more
likely due to the length of time it takes to write and produce law-review articles than to
the fact that they have little to say. Even those who appear on talk shows and write op-ed
pieces understand the relative values of hindsight and history.
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But Americans especially must be careful not to tread on hard-won individual
rights without a reasonable degree of certainty that preventive and investigative measures
are temporary and absolutely necessary.
National security and individual liberty, after all, are two sides of the same coin.
Counter-terrorism measures should be the least-restrictive means by which security can
be enhanced.

In light of the government’s demonstrably aggressive aspirations, who is

to say that the American Civil Liberties Union is overstating the point when it suggests
that the Bush Administration’s “insatiable appetite for control” is out of control?468
The legislation promulgated in the wake of 9/11 – enabling secret arrests,
detentions, trials and deportations of terrorist suspects; ethnic profiling; the Terrorist
Information Prevention System; and new surveillance techniques – has been criticized by
both liberals and conservatives. Both Democrats and Republicans have decried the USA
Patriot Act as triggering governmental intrusions, such as the search for and seizure of
previously private records, upon the mere assertion of the possibility of a connection to
terrorist activity.
To be sure parts of the Patriot Act – like information-sharing between the CIA
and FBI. – have been acceptable even to its harshest critics But the government already
has enough investigative powers to prosecute suspected terrorists. The Patriot Act goes
too far, and in so doing violates everyone’s civil liberties.
It is well-settled Constitutional law that basic First-Amendment, due-process, and
equal-protection rights are not limited to citizens, but apply to all persons within the
United States or subject to U.S. authority. These are human rights, not privileges of
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citizenship. So too, arguendo, are the criminal-procedural protections afforded by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments which, arguably at least, could be extended to individuals
subjected to trial in military tribunals.
The Administration’s underlying defense of its policies is that unprecedented risks
warrant unprecedented responses. Indeed it is hard to dispute the idea that the world
grows more dangerous every day. But that aphorism was equally apt during earlier
conflicts. No better example was World War II, in which there was also a surprise attack
on American soil (at Pearl Harbor) and when weapons of mass destruction inflicted far
more severe damage that those used in World War I. It was true as recently as during the
cold war with the former Soviet Union, armed as that nation was with huge stockpiles of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weaponry.
While the Bush Administration may arguably be justified in seeking to destroy
weapons of mass destruction possessed by our self-proclaimed enemies, even to replace
their rogue regimes, it has yet to make the case that these threats justify compromising
our fundamental principles of liberty and justice.469
Perhaps the most egregious aspect of the USA Patriot Act is its elevation of
secrecy as a prosecutorial tool. As one federal judge recently put it, “Democracies die
behind closed doors.”470 Government policies that rely on deception and dogma to
conceal failures often collapse in failure. Though it is obviously unreasonable to expect
the military to disclose every aspect of its operations, the public – aware that actions
taken today will likely have a long-lasting effect upon the country’s foreign relations –
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should at least know what its fighting forces are trying to accomplish in the name of the
United States.
The government should have to bear a heavy burden of proof that its restrictions
on our civil liberties are absolutely necessary. We should hold people accountable for
their own actions, not blame them based on their ethnic, political, or religious identities.
No one should be imprisoned without a public accounting, reviewable in a civil court.471
In these times of terror and tension, the urge to use whatever means necessary to
defeat our enemies is understandable. Perhaps this war on terrorism is so potentially
cataclysmic that we must lock people up indefinitely, without formally charging them, in
order to prevent them from perpetrating acts of mass destruction, or merely to find out
what they know. Perhaps this war is fundamentally different from all that have been
waged in the past. Perhaps we have no choice but to trust the government and its
intelligence agencies when they demand secrecy.
But to do so, we must fully understand, is to abandon the Constitution that we
have fought so long to preserve.
The farther we stray from our hard-won freedoms in order to vanquish those who
would destroy our way of life, the more we become like them – and the more hollow our
ultimate victory.
The perilous quest to preserve civil liberties in uncivil times is not an easy one,
but the wisdom of Benjamin Franklin should remain a beacon: “Societies that trade
liberty for security end often with neither.”
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